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Abstract
The Cloud trend is an attempt to leverage economics of scale in the domain of computing
resources. Unfortunately, this often means losing control of the lower levels of a computer
system, and exposing users to new threat vectors. These threats may be signiﬁcant enough to
forbid the use of clouds, and force giving up on their economical advantages.
Chapter 1 introduces some issues with current cloud storage systems, that should be ﬁxed
before a cloud storage system can be considered as safe as a self-managed system. Among
these, we will focus on censorship resistance. We also explain the not immediately obvious
way in which they relate to issues discussed in the last two chapters.
Chapter 2 formally deﬁnes censorship-resistance and describes the STEP-archive, an abstract
model for a generic class of censorship-resistant storage systems. Within this model, we
expose an asymmetry in hardness between attack algorithms (trying to perform censorship)
and defense algorithms (trying to repair censored ﬁles). We discuss ideal choices for the many
parameters and derive useful mathematical bounds when possible. We also simulate the
behaviour of an ideal storage system to obtain experimental evidence of the effect of these
parameter choices. We show that this model exhibits several counter-intuitive properties.
Chapter 3 deals with the issue of incorrect key generation. Cryptography being an essential
component of our proposed secure storage system, we discuss common pitfalls in implemen-
tations of popular asymmetric cryptographic algorithms, and evidence of their presence in
real-world implementations.
Chapter 4 discusses an operational aspect of storage systems, the choice of a block storage
unit, and the consequences of lack thereof. In particular, it shows how the size of a ciphertext
can act as a side channel and leak information about encrypted contents to an attacker, within
the context of large media ﬁles distributed through public ﬁle sharing systems.
Key words: censorship, cloud, coding, cryptography, storage.
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Résumé
Le Cloud est une tentative d’exploiter l’économie d’échelle dans le contexte des ressources de
calcul. Malheureusement, cela signiﬁe souvent renoncer au contrôle des couches inférieures
du système informatique et exposer ses utilisateurs à de nouvelles opportunités d’attaques.
Ces nouvelles menaces peuvent constituer des risques conséquents, assez pour renoncer aux
avantages des services de cloud.
Le Chapitre 1 est une introduction aux limitations des systèmes de stockage en cloud actuels,
lesquelles doivent impérativement être dépassées pour qu’un système de stockage en cloud
puisse offrir un modèle de sécurité équivalent à un système auto-hébergé. Parmi celles-ci,
nous nous intéresserons plus particulièrement à la résistance à la censure. Nous expliquerons
aussi les liens non évidents entre ces limitations et les sujets abordés dans les deux derniers
chapitres.
Le Chapitre 2 donne une déﬁnition formelle de la résistance à la censure et décrit l’archive
STEP, un modèle abstrait représentant un système de stockage généraliste et résistant à la
censure. Dans le cadre de ce modèle, nous montrons d’intéressantes asymétries entre la difﬁ-
culté des algorithmes d’attaques (exécutant une opération de censure) et de défense (réparant
les données perdues par la censure). Nous discutons du choix optimal des nombreux para-
mètres du modèle et établissons quelques bornes mathématiques. Nous étudions également
son comportement par des simulations et validons expérimentalement certains choix de
paramètres. Nous montrons certains aspects par lesquels ce modèle se comporte de manière
contre-intuitive.
Le Chapitre 3 traite du problème de la génération incorrecte de clefs cryptographiques. La
cryptographie étant la pierre angulaire de tout système de stockage sécurisé, nous y abordons
les pièges courants dans l’implémentation des algorithmes asymétriques les plus populaires,
et montrons des preuves de leur existence dans le monde réel.
Le Chapitre 4 traite d’un aspect opérationnel des systèmes de stockage, à savoir le choix d’une
taille de bloc, et de ses conséquences. En particulier, nous déterminons si et comment la
taille d’un message chiffré peut constituer un canal auxiliaire et révéler de l’information à un
attaquant passif, dans le contexte de la distribution publique de grands ﬁchiers multimédia.
Mots clefs : censure, cloud, codage, cryptographie, stockage
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1 Current Issues with Cloud Storage
Cloud computing is a trend full of promises. Offering a free market for computing resources,
we can greatly increase hardware utilization; we also save on power, cooling, and commu-
nication costs through the use of shared systems, concentrated into tight physical locations.
Concentration allows saving on power and cooling (large-scale electrical transformers and
cooling systems are more efﬁcient), and on networking (much higher bandwidth can be
achieved over short distances).
Yet, by doing so, we open Security Pandora’s box, for information now ﬂows and is processed
by systems owned and controlled by third parties, possibly located in other countries with
different legislation.
Ideally, a perfect cloud-based service should present the same threat model as a system owned
and managed directly by the customer. This should be true even if the customer does not fully
trust the cloud provider.
Secure remote general-purpose computation is a difﬁcult problem. Key progress was made
by [G+09], and numerous optimizations have been further developed, but they still impose
several orders of magnitudes of computational overhead, and are thus impractical in all but
the most extremely unbalanced scenarios (where the computing power of a cloud service
dwarfs the power available to the end-user).
Instead of tackling this difﬁcult general problem, this work is restricted to the much simpler
scenario of trusted storage on third-party systems. The untrusted third-party system is not
required to perform arbitrary computations, but just to store and retrieve opaque data.
1.1 Cloud Requirements and Trust Model
Well-understood cryptographic techniques, properly used on the client side, can already
protect data conﬁdentiality, integrity, and authenticity. However, there are other desirable
properties relating to more exotic issues:
1
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• Ensuring reliability from a third-party storage provider is harder than ensuring it on a
privately-owned system. While in the latter case one only has to guard against accidental
failures, in the former the storage provider may have an economic incentive to lie about
its actual reliability. This issue can be addressed with proof-of-storage protocols. A
trivial proof-of-storage protocol is to periodically perform a full retrieval of the contents;
more advanced protocols, like [ZX12, JKJ07], can give a good probabilistic assurance
that the contents are retrievable, at a much lower bandwidth cost.
• For content that is meant to be distributed to a wide audience, centralization creates
opportunities of arbitrary censorship by the storage provider. Even if the provider is not
itself willing to censor content, it may be coerced into it by a legal authority, or become
the target of blackmail by other powerful attackers. These censoring threats may occur
at unpredictable times and under great pressure. Defending against them is harder than
in the previous case, where it is sufﬁcient to ensure that the provider has, on average, an
economic incentive to behave correctly. Chapter 2 investigates a possible direction for
censorship-resistant storage systems.
• Beyond censorship, anonymity may be an important requirement. A cloud storage
provider, if it is in position of knowing the identities of all the content publishers using
its service, may become a prime target for various surveillance-oriented attackers. Usage
of cloud storage resources implies usage of network resources. Systems like Tor [DMS04]
partially help, but there are still side-channel threats to anonymity when large amounts
of data move around.
• Anonymity of the content author is one thing when volunteers agree to provide free
storage space. When storage space must be paid, however, one must be careful to ensure
anonymity of the payment trail as well.
1.1.1 Comparison with peer-to-peer systems
Distributed peer-to-peer storage systems exhibit good robustness properties against an at-
tacker trying to perform censorship, assuming the attacker cannot control the majority, or
even a signiﬁcant fraction, of the participating peers. This assumption may no longer hold
when a majority of peers run or store data on cloud systems under control of a small number
of large service providers. Therefore, it is not sufﬁcient to simply run a peer-to-peer system
on top of cloud resources, however tempting it may be. We wish to design a system with
different guarantees, that can resist censorship without precluding the use of centralized cloud
resources.
1.1.2 Mutability
Mutability refers to the way a storage system handles data getting modiﬁed over time. A
mutable system offers an interface to store and read data objects, but also to modify all or part
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of it at a given point in time. It means the system must also handle some form of locking or
conﬂict resolution, should modiﬁcation requests occur concurrently.
By contrast, an immutable system only supports creation of new data objects, optionally
deletion, and reads. Modiﬁcation can be emulated by creating a new, separate, version of the
object, then dropping the old one. For many use cases, this may be much less efﬁcient than
a mutable interface; a small modiﬁcation to a large object will wastefully recreate an almost
identical copy of the object. However, an immutable model is also safer and friendlier: neither
locking nor conﬂict resolution are required, it suits concurrent operation better, and it makes
it easier to implement cryptographic integrity checks.
Chapters 2 and 4 both consider a system operating on top of cloud services offering an
immutable storage interface.
1.1.3 Deduplication
Deduplication is the practice of recognizing redundant data blocks in a storage system, and
save space by storing only a single copy. This may be done at different granularities: at the
ﬁle level, with ﬁxed data blocks, or with more complicated schemes like rolling hashes to split
data into variable-sized slices.
For a large storage provider, deduplication may be an integral part of the business model: the
data is stored once, but customers may be billed multiple times. This is especially worthwhile
for large contents that get shared without any modiﬁcations, for instance multimedia ﬁles.
Deduplicating mutable storage is more expensive; a copy-on-write mechanism must be used
to distinguish previously identical copies when one of them is getting modiﬁed. No such issue
exists with an immutable interface.
• File-level deduplication is easy to implement in an immutable system. If every ﬁle
is indexed by a cryptographically secure hash, it is natural to use this index both for
retrieval and deduplication.
• Block-level deduplication operates on blocks of ﬁxed size. It is typically much more
expensive than ﬁle-level, if only because the number of objects to consider is much
higher. It is however more interesting in some speciﬁc scenarios, typically with big ﬁles
containing common substructures with predictable alignment. This is notably the case
for ﬁlesystem images, used to distribute or store virtual machines, and optical media
images (for instance rips of DVDs).
• Variable-block-level (sometimes inaccurately called Byte-level) uses techniques to slice
a ﬁle into pieces of variable sizes, ideally with piece sizes following a geometrical distri-
bution, in a way that makes the pieces locations depend only on the piece contents, and
possibly the close surroundings of the piece. This makes it possible to share common
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contents even if they appear at unaligned offsets in different ﬁles.
Rolling hashes
One early technique to ﬁnd local split points is the Lyndon factorization, which splits a
sequence of symbols (bytes, words, or bigger blocks) into a list of the largest possible sub-
sequences, such as every sub-sequence has the property of being, of all its cyclic rotations, the
one that comes ﬁrst in lexicographic order. Such a factorization is unique and the split points
can be computed in linear time.
Another technique is to decide on the split points with a rolling hash. Contrary to what the
name suggests, a rolling hash is not a cryptographically secure hash, but rather a fast digest
that can be efﬁciently computed from an old version when bytes are appended at one end of
the data, and removed at the other.
This way, it is possible to efﬁciently compute the value of a ﬁxed-size chunk of data within a
ﬁle at every possible location, with low memory usage. Every location that exhibits a rolling
hash of a special form will become a distinguished point over which the ﬁle can be sliced.
With this technique, if different ﬁles share a large part of identical data, even at unpredictable
and unaligned offsets, the distinguished points are guaranteed to be identical everywhere
but on the two borders of the identical parts, within two windows of the size of the rolling
hash window. All the slices between the two furthest distinguished points will be considered
identical and deduplicated.
1.2 The case of Tahoe
Tahoe is an example of a secure cloud ﬁlesystem with good security properties. It uses an
immutable storage model for data, and optionally mutable metadata. Encryption is done
client-side, and data is always authenticated. Data is stored redundantly across several nodes,
using Reed-Solomon coding over stripes within a ﬁle. The stripes themselves have arbitrary
length, and are encrypted with a stream-like CTR mode.
Tahoe provides neither a censorship-resistance mechanism, nor a proof-of-storage mecha-
nism. Access control is done by capabilities, so in a basic setup there is no need for identity
management. However, in such a basic setup, storage space is a shared resource between
participants, and freeloaders can use more space than what they contribute.
1.2.1 Extending to Censorship Resistance
Chapter 2 describes the STEP-archive, an abstract model for a generic censorship-resistant
storage system, that extends and covers the behaviour of some early censorship-resistant
systems like Tangler [Wal01] and Dagster [SW01]. It provides both censorship resistance and
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redundancy as two integrated properties.
Inspiration for these early systems came from an interesting practical realization: in many
parts of the world, some data may be illegal to possess. To the layman, it is not obvious whether
a storage provider should be liable for allowing customers to store illegal data. However, it
makes no sense to criminalize possession of random data.
Suppose a customer encrypts illegal data using a one-time pad, and stores both the key and
the ciphertext on two different storage providers. If the key has correctly been chosen truly
randomly, it is impossible1 to distinguish the ciphertext from the key. Thus, even if one
considers possession of encrypted data to be reprehensible, it is impossible to put the blame
on one or the other provider. Furthermore, the key may also have been already present in
the system for other reasons, instead of having been generated for the occasion. Unless one
can prove that one side of the storage (the key) predated the other (the ciphertext), then one
must consider that at least one provider may not even have been willing to cooperate with the
law-breaking customer.
This property is not unique to one-time pad encryption. It also applies, for instance, to the
non-systematic error correction codes we use in Chapter 2.
1.2.2 Key proliferation by Mutability
For mutable metadata, updates are authenticated by binding an RSA public key to the mutable
metadata identiﬁer, and signing all new (immutable) versions of the data with the correspond-
ing private key. This leads to a proliferation of RSA keypairs. Chapter 3 discusses the possible
pitfalls of incorrect key generation, and in particular pitfalls exacerbated when keypairs are
being massively generated.
1.2.3 Storage incentives and Anonymity
An obvious way to defend against freeloaders is to account for space usage by all the partici-
pants in a Tahoe grid. Such accounting defeats anonymity.
We have considered an anonymous payment protocol based on Chaum’s Blind Signatures.
Blind Signatures are introduced in [Cha82] as a building block for an anonymous, ofﬂine,
electronic cash payment system.
Ofﬂine electronic payment systems need a way to prevent double spending. In [Cha82],
double spending is detected a posteriori by a complicated probabilistic protocol that lifts
the anonymity of cheaters with high probability. However, in the case of immutable storage
systems, a very interesting improvement can be made: since an immutable block of data can
already be identiﬁed by a secure hash, we can use this hash instead of a random nonce when
1In the information-theoretic sense.
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generating the blinded cash coin. This makes double spending irrelevant: a user may try
to cheat by paying several times with the same coin to store the same data block, but if the
storage system performs deduplication, it allocates resources only once, and no value is lost2.
Unfortunately, in practice our naive attempts at such a protocol suffered from side-channel
attacks. Because the blinded coin cannot be generated before the data hash is known, it is
not possible to pay for storage in advance. Thus there would be strong time correlations
between the space payment transactions and the data uploads, defeating the purpose of
anonymous payments. However, because the payment messages are small compared to the
actual data, and because a storage provider could certainly tolerate a non-realtime operation
of the payment protocol, alternatives like [CGF10] may work better than Tor in this scenario.
Still, such a payment protocol would cause another proliferation of RSA keypairs, and another
reason to look at the issues presented in Chapter 3
1.2.4 Variable block sizes
Tahoe uses variable-length stripes to store data. For efﬁciency, the encrypted ﬁle is split
into ﬁxed-size segments, and the segments are then striped across several primary shares, of
identical length (up to the segment size), with the sum of the primary share sizes being roughly
equal to the size of the encrypted ﬁle. An error-correcting code is then applied to compute
a number of secondary shares, having the same size as the primary shares. Authentication
and integrity checking range over the entire share; it is not possible to address a segment
individually (although segments may be integrity-checked individually through a Merkle tree).
For the purpose of the STEP model considered in Chapter 2, it is easier to consider only storage
of ﬁxed-size blocks, and consider that the underlying storage system addresses blocks, not
entire stripes.
While it may seem trivial to impose a ﬁxed block size, by adding a block layer on top of the
system, such a change is not benign in terms of security. Chapter 4 deals with the implications,
including a possible subsequent leak of conﬁdentiality.
1.3 Conclusion
This concludes our overview of current issues. We hope that the STEP construction constitutes
a sound basis for bringing censorship resistance properties to cloud storage. Success in
implementing these properties could lift some of the current barriers to adoption of cloud
platforms, and allow users to beneﬁt from power and bandwidth savings even for security-
sensitive applications.
2This only works if the storage provider gives up on the practice of gouging users by making them pay an
individual price for a shared resource.
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2 STEP-archival: A Storage Model for
Censorship-Resistance
2.1 Introduction
The way we store and archive data is being transformed by the emergence of information and
communication technologies. These new tools open worlds of new opportunities but at the
same they time pose signiﬁcant challenges. Among these technologies, distributed ﬁle storage,
sharing and synchronization systems on the cloud are becoming ubiquitous, and all major
information technology players are offering some ﬂavor of it: Dropbox, iCloud, Google Drive,
OneDrive, Amazon S3, ... They provide easy access to data from multiple devices and locations
as well as protection against data loss from hardware failures. However, recent developments
in the wake of the expansive and sometimes unauthorized government access to private and
sensitive data raise major privacy and security concerns about data located in the cloud,
especially when data is physically located or must transit outside the legal jurisdiction of its
rightful owner.
In this chapter, we consider long-term digital data storage and permanent archiving. A ﬁrst
major challenge is data integrity. The objective is to provide veriﬁable guarantees to users
that their data is properly, securely, and reliably archived. For instance, if a storage provider
guarantees that the equivalent of three copies of each piece of data is archived on three
continents, how can users verify that this claim is more than a marketing slogan? In practice,
it appears difﬁcult to prove this claim in a simple and convincing way. Users rely mostly in
the good faith they have in their providers (and in the catastrophic consequences for their
providers’ bottom line should they lose the data). Another question is how can a user be
sure that his data will not stop being taken care of after a system update or a maintenance
budget cut, or that its data will be as securely and reliably stored as data from very large paying
customers using the same service? These problems are especially relevant with old archives,
some of which might not need to be accessed for decades.
A second challenge of digital storage and permanent archiving is tamper resistance. This
is closely related to protection against censorship. Research and scientiﬁc data as well as
medical, legal and ﬁnancial records can include very sensitive information that can be viewed
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as threatening or compromising by potential censors. A good archival system must thus make
it very difﬁcult for a powerful censor to irrecoverably destroy or tamper with archived data,
especially in an undetectable way. This is a different issue from the traditional deﬁnition
of data integrity and authenticity, for which there already exist plenty of solutions from the
client perspective using client-side cryptography. For compliance and legal reasons, such
sensitive data may be stored using a “write-once, read-many” (WORM) technology. WORM
storage is a niche market of secure data storage solutions that has been historically fulﬁlled
using hardware approaches. Physical implementations offer more constrained data access
than logical approaches and are more dependent on hardware robustness against failures and
destruction. The implementation of software approaches for anti-tampering is an active topic
of investigation and no satisfying solution is available in practice.
Censorship effectiveness is highly dependent on the communication technologies used to
spread the censored information. In our modern world of electronic communications, infor-
mation ﬂows in such volume that human-based censorship has become impossible. Infor-
mation processing systems can, however, be used for automated censorship. The emergence
of ubiquitous, interoperable communication networks makes it easier to implement global
automated censorship.
The extreme impracticality of censoring mouth-to-ear communication ultimately makes
censorship a lost cause: Determination to transmit a message is the only requirement for
eventually ﬁnding a way. However, large-scale automated censorship can still have damaging
consequences. Fear of censorship or surveillance may hinder the adoption of otherwise
promising communication technologies.
This issue is prevalent in the context of cloud storage, where a storage service provider could
be pressured into removing speciﬁc contents, against the will of their customers. Beyond legal
pressure, employees could also be bribed or coerced into damaging customer data. Fear of
data losses may drive customers away from cloud storage and its cost-saving beneﬁts.
There is currently no archival system providing strong anti-tampering and data integrity.
Designing such a system is a surprisingly difﬁcult endeavor, both in theory and in practice.
This is the main objective of our work.
2.1.1 State of the art
Data integrity, protection against tampering and anti-censorship have been studied in var-
ious forms and for a large number of settings and applications. Work on these topics in-
clude the Eternity Service [And96], Publius [WRC00], Freenet [CSWH01], Free Haven [DFM01],
Dagster [SW01], Tangler [Wal01], SiRiUS [jGSMB03], Tahoe [WOW08], Clouds [BHL+08] and
POTSHARDS [SGMV09].
Randomized encryption can be used to prevent a malicious storage system from extracting
information about its users by observing with whom they share ﬁles. It can also be used to
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prevent the system from preemptively censor documents corresponding to known content.
This has been implemented with success in practice, notably by the Tahoe [WOW08] ﬁlesys-
tem under the name of Convergent Encryption. Encryption keys are semi-deterministically
derived from the hash of a cleartext block so that efﬁcient deduplication can still be performed
on encrypted blocks to reduce storage space. However, a third party could publish the en-
cryption key for a particular block, and prove that some block decrypts to censorable content,
prompting an authority to individually censor particular blocks.
Data integrity and resistance against tampering are not easy to deﬁne, especially when consid-
ering how to provide these features in a practical way. For instance, in [WRC00], the authors
informally write “Our system should make it extremely difﬁcult for a third party to make
changes to or force the deletion of published materials”. This was also observed in [PRW05],
which provided a more formal deﬁnition of censorship resistance in the context of selective
ﬁltering. A deﬁnition of data integrity was made in [AFYZ07], but in such a strong way that it
cannot be achieved in practical systems.
Other interesting related work includes plausibly-deniable search [17912] and proofs of storage
and retrievability [ZX12, JKJ07]. In [JKJ07] the authors describe an efﬁcient proof of retrievabil-
ity mechanism that allows a client to verify the existence of a piece of data in a storage system.
The authors correctly note, however, that such a mechanism cannot guarantee that the system
will agree to disclose the actual data when prompted to do so.
In [AFYZ07], the authors studied data integrity and developed a theory of data entanglement.
One of their contributions is the introduction of all-or-nothing integrity: intuitively, either
all the documents are recoverable with high probability, or no document is. They show
that all-or-nothing integrity is possible with some restrictions on the power of the attacker.
[ADDV15] extended the work by providing a stronger deﬁnition of all-or-nothing integrity
and a simulation-based security analysis. The protocols provided in both articles [AFYZ07,
ADDV15] remain far from real-life implementations: they require to read the entire data store
to retrieve a document, and require to process the entire data store to add a new document,
which is not scalable. Furthermore, no document is recoverable if the storage provider corrupts
or fails to maintain a small part of the data.
Providing anti-censorship using data entanglement was ﬁrst proposed by Dagster [SW01]
and Tangler [Wal01], which both can be seen as special cases of the approach we propose in
this chapter. In Dagster, documents and blocks have the same size. To add a new document
in the system, c blocks already stored are chosen at random, and a new block consisting
of the exclusive-or of the new document with the c blocks is stored. A censor wanting to
delete a document can erase one of its c+1 blocks, and on average over all documents this
will destroy on average O(c) other documents, the older documents being more protected
than newer ones. In Tangler, two old blocks chosen randomly and a new document to be
archived are used to generate two new blocks using (3,4) Shamir secret sharing [Sha79]. The
two new blocks are then stored. The original document can be recovered with any three of the
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four blocks using Lagrange interpolation. In [AFYZ07], it was shown that erasing two blocks
from a random Tangler document erases on average O( lognn ) other documents. However, the
number of documents erased irrecoverably is much smaller, since some partly corrupted
documents can be decoded to recover erased blocks. No analysis of the system resistance
against tampering is presented.
Finally, WORM storage has a long history predating CD-R disks and was commercialized in
several forms for protection against tampering: tape cartridges, secure digital ﬂash memory
cards, SD cards, ... Recent solutions include WORM HDDs, where the protection against data
rewrite is embedded at the physical disk level [wor].
2.1.2 Our contributions
In this chapter, we introduce STEP-archives. Using data entanglement and erasure-correcting
codes, we study and develop a data storage architecture where a stored document can only
be deleted or modiﬁed by compromising the integrity of other documents in the system.
There are two main objectives behind this work. The ﬁrst objective is data integrity. We
want to provide guarantees to users that their data cannot be deleted or corrupted without
compromising other data stored by themselves or other users. The second objective is to
provide censorship resistance by forcing a censor who wants to tamper with data to do so
noisily, and corrupt a large number of other documents in the system. An ancillary result
deriving from the two objectives is increased redundancy and protection against failures,
which can be seen as attacks from random or failure-speciﬁc censors.
Attacker - defender asymmetry
An attacker who wants to tamper with a document must try to destroy it irrecoverably by
recursively eliminating all cascading dependencies in other documents. One of the interesting
aspects of our approach is its asymmetry. On the one hand, it is easy to repair the system if the
damage done by an attacker is recoverable. On the other hand, we prove that irrecoverably
destroying a target document while minimizing collateral damage is NP-hard. Finding an
irrecoverable attack whose collateral damage is less than optimal but within a reasonable ratio
from the optimal solution is also NP-hard.
System robustness
In [AFYZ07, ADDV15], it is impossible to recover anything if the storage provider corrupts or
fails to maintain a small part of the data. Although this feature is a strong incentive for the
storage provider to behave responsibly, it has the perverse effect that a malicious attacker,
having compromised an honest provider, can deny the access to all the data by denying access
to a small part of the system, and irrecoverably destroy the entire data by corrupting a small
amount of it. We take the dual approach to achieve the same objective: when a document
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has been archived long enough, it can only be lost by destroying a large number of other
documents. However, for an archive to reach the state where old documents are irrecoverably
destroyed, the storage provider must be very sloppy, or the attacker must be very powerful
and willing to do a lot of work.
Entanglement strategies and suboptimal attacks
After introducing and describing our architecture, we present different entanglement strategies
and suboptimal attacks within this model, and study how their interactions affect the system
resilience. We show that entangling data in a sliding window limited to the recent past bounds
the collateral damage required to irrecoverably destroy a document. We also provide evidence
that entanglement chosen uniformly at random forces an attacker who wants to irrecoverably
destroy a document archived long enough to destroy a constant fraction of all documents
archived after it.
Practical considerations
We emphasize that our objective is to achieve both data integrity and censorship resistance in
a way implementable in practical systems. Thus, we use practical constraints that keep an
actual implementation realistic (for instance avoiding reads and writes in ω(1) of the total
system size) while being simple enough to allow analysis. All our underlying assumptions and
design choices are implementable using state-of-the-art coding and storage techniques.
2.1.3 Outline
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 2.2, we present generic assumptions
and constraints. The storage architecture is formally described in Section 2.3, and the recovery
algorithm in Section 2.4. We analyze the optimal attack in Section 2.5, and describe suboptimal
attacks in Section 2.6. Two entanglement strategies, proximity entanglement, and uniformly
random entanglement, are respectively studied in Sections 2.7 and 2.8. In Section 2.9, we
discuss extensions and general security considerations. Finally, we conclude the paper in
Section 2.10.
2.2 Model assumptions and architecture constraints
In this sectionwe describe the main assumptions and constraints used throughout this chapter.
They are simple and realistic for a ﬁrst contribution on this topic. However, it should be clear
that they can be relaxed and extended in various ways, as discussed in Section 2.9.
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2.2.1 Censorship resistance
Our goal is to offer a storage system providing some level of censorship resistance (CR) imple-
mentable both with centralized and decentralized architectures, in the sense that security
guarantees still hold when most hardware resources are under the control of a single entity.
A censorship resistant system makes it difﬁcult, even for the entity in control of the system, to
silently and selectively refuse to answer particular requests without denying service for other
unrelated requests. We precisely deﬁne three levels of censorship resistance.
• Perfect CR: Either all the read requests can be fulﬁlled, or none can. This is similar to
all-or-nothing integrity as deﬁned in [AFYZ07].
• Strong CR: If the system is unable to fulﬁll a read request, then a constant fraction of
possible read requests cannot be fulﬁlled (collateral damage).
• Weak (resource driven) CR: The system must spend an amount of hardware resources
proportional to the size of the system to censor a read request.
In ultimate recourse, the service provider can always be forced to shut down entirely. Our
deﬁnition of Perfect CR follows from this observation: in a perfect system, there is no better way
to censor data. The difference between Strong CR and Weak CR is that the former guarantees
that a censorship attempt will have an impact on the system clients and cannot go unnoticed,
whereas with the latter case an attacker could coerce the system to perform censorship,
coercion invisible to other users.
We emphasize that we tackle data integrity, tamper resistance and censorship resistance at
the same time, and thus use all terms interchangeably. For instance, with Perfect CR, every
document in the archive is as reliably archived as every other document, thus the integrity of
every document is the same. We formally discuss the equivalence of data integrity, tamper
resistance and censorship resistance in Section 2.3.
2.2.2 Storage interface
We will achieve data integrity and protection against tampering with a coding scheme for
which unrelated pieces of data will become mutually dependent. Since we are looking for
efﬁcient and practical implementations, our ﬁrst constraint is that we only consider solutions
that can archive a new document using only a small constant amount of data already archived.
Our second constraint is the use of an immutable data store as the underlying storage structure.
In this setting, updates effectively become new documents. This is a reasonable assumption
for a large class of applications. The two constraints work in tandem in the sense that any
system that allows to rewrite existing data easily has weak integrity and little protection against
tampering.
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Our third constraint is that the metadata is readable by a malicious attacker, who knows which
data blocks belong to each document. The attacker also knows the creation date of each data
block and can therefore order them chronologically. Our fourth constraint is that the system
operates on ﬁxed-size data blocks.
Finally, our ﬁfth constraint is that the communication protocol provides self-integrity, that is,
when fetching the key of a stored block B , the system must either return the same block B or
an error; it cannot return another data block B ′ =B . In practice, this is achieved by having the
key computed as a cryptographically secure hash function of B , and have the client recompute
the hash from the data and check the matching key after every read operation. A malicious
server must be able to break the hash function in order to break this self-integrity. A related
assumption is that the attacker can tamper with data blocks, but not with metadata. Thus,
after an attack or failure, the system knows from the metadata which data blocks have been
corrupted or tampered with, i.e., the errors are erasures. We examine the consequences of
relaxing these assumptions in Sections 2.9 and 2.10 .
2.2.3 Snapshotting
If the state of the system can be cheaply snapshot, then tampering can be implemented
by reverting the system to an earlier state not containing the tampered data. Thus, with
immutable data structures, the best system will at most guarantee that data can only be
tampered by destroying all data stored after it. Perfect censorship-resistance is unattainable
in this context. Although this can be seen as an undesirable property, we argue that we cannot
achieve perfect CR without violating our ﬁrst constraint. Moreover, digital storage capacity
and usage have increased at an exponential rate for the last 40 years and might do so for the
foreseeable future. This allows the possibility to provide comprehensive anti-tampering and
integrity quickly on a time scale.
2.3 Entanglement architecture using erasures codes
Deﬁnition 1. A (s, t ,e,p)-archive is a storage system where each archived document consists of
a code word with s source blocks, t tangled blocks, p parity blocks and that can correct e  p− s
block erasures.
When a document is archived, it is split into s ≥ 1 source blocks. Using the s source blocks
with t distinct old blocks already archived, a systematic maximum distance separable (MDS)
code [LC04] is used to create p ≥ s parity blocks which are then archived on the system. The
process is drawn in ﬁgure 2.1.
The code rate is s+ts+t+p , but since only the parity blocks are archived, the storage rate on the
physical medium is sp . An archived document can be recovered from s+ t or more of its blocks.
The code can correct p block erasures per document codeword, but since the source blocks
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Figure 2.1 – Encoding of a single document in STEP-archival
are not archived and are considered as erased, at most e  p− s block erasures per document
on the storage medium can be corrected.1 Note that increasing t does not increase storage
overhead or error-correcting capability, but does increase coding and decoding complexity.
An attacker can censor a document dk by erasing more than e blocks from it. However, by
entangling new documents with documents already archived, it might be possible for the
system to recover the deleted blocks by decoding other documents that use them. As an
example, consider the (1,3,2,3)-archive presented in Figure 2.2. Each document codeword
consists of one source block, three pointers to old blocks, and three parity blocks. Only the
parity blocks are stored when a new document is archived; the source block is not stored and
the pointer blocks were previously stored as parity blocks of older documents. Block 0 is a
known anchor that cannot be corrupted. If an MDS code is used, any four of the six stored
blocks belonging to a document are sufﬁcient to recover it (i.e., e = 2). In Figure 2.2a, an
attacker wants to censor document d5 by erasing its blocks {2,7,11,13,14,15} from the archive.
However, although d5 cannot be recovered directly, all the blocks are recoverable: Block 2 can
be recovered by decoding d1 or d2, Block 7 can be recovered by decoding d3, d4 or d8, Block
11 can be recovered by decoding d4, Block 14 can be recovered by decoding d7, Block 15 can
be recovered by decoding d8, and in the last step Block 13 can be recovered by decoding d5.
Having been unable to erase d5, the attacker continues his attack more cleverly and further
erases Blocks 20, 21, 22 and 24, as illustrated in Figure 2.2b. Document d5 is now destroyed
irrecoverably, as are also d7 and d8 (the irrecoverable blocks and documents are shown in red).
Blocks 2, 7 and 11 are still recoverable, which means that the attacker could have irrecoverably
destroyed d5 without destroying them.
1It is also possible to use a code which is systematic for the old entangled blocks but not for the source blocks.
This allows us to puncture the code without decreasing its error-correcting capability since the source blocks must
no longer be erased.
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(a) Blocks {2,7,11,13,14,15} are erased.
(b) Blocks {2,7,11,13,14,15,20,21,22,24} are
erased.
Figure 2.2 – (1,3,2,3)-archive. 4 out of 6 blocks are required to recover a document.
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Deﬁnition 2. A set of documents form an integrity set I if and only if, for all the documents in
I , at least e +1 blocks do not appear in any document of the complementary set I . We write
I (dk ) to express that a document dk belongs to I .
If an attacker wants to irrecoverably censor a document dk , he must partition the set of
documents in two: an integrity set I (dk) of corrupted documents including dk , each with
at least e +1 erased blocks2, and the complementary set I (dk ) of uncorrupted documents
without any erased block.
Deﬁnition 3. LetA be the set of all (s, t ,e,p)-archives with K ≥ k archived documents and ﬁxed
s, t ,e, and p3. We write Imin(dk ) to denote the size of the smallest integrity set of document dk
for a ﬁxed archive a ∈A , Imin(dk ) min
1≤ j≤k
(Imin(dj )) for the size of the smallest of the integrity
sets of the ﬁrst k documents for a ﬁxed archive a ∈A , and maxImin(dk)max
a∈A
(Imin(dk)) for
the largest Imin(dk ) over all possible archives a ∈A . We write Imin and maxImin when K  k.
Note that Imin(dk), maxImin(dk), Imin and maxImin are nondecreasing functions of k. The
dependency between documents is not symmetric: if the smallest integrity set containing
document dk also contains document dl , the smallest integrity set containing dl does not
necessarily contain dk , and Imin(dl )≤ Imin(dk ).
Our goal is to ensure that the smallest integrity set is as large as possible for every document.
If the smallest integrity set is large, we guarantee data integrity, tamper resistance and censor
resistance at the same time: every document dk is as securely and reliably archived as the
smallest integrity set containing it. A large Imin with K  k guarantees that all old enough
documents have good integrity.
Another relevant parameter is the size of the integrity window required to irrecoverably delete
a document. The integrity window of an integrity set I = {di ,di1 ,di2 , . . . ,dj } where i < i1 < i2 <
·· · < j is W  {di ,di+1,di+2, . . . ,dj }, and its size is j − i +1. It is the number of documents,
including documents that are not deleted, from the oldest to the most recent document of a
given integrity set.
Deﬁnition 4. LetA be the set of all (s, t ,e,p)-archives with K ≥ k archived documents and ﬁxed
s, t ,e, and p4. We writeWmin(dk ) to denote the size of smallest integrity window of document dk
for a ﬁxed archive a ∈A , Wmin(dk ) min
1≤ j≤k
(Wmin(dj )) for the size of the smallest of the integrity
windows of the ﬁrst k documents for a ﬁxed archive a ∈A , and maxWmin(dk )max
a∈A
(Wmin(dk ))
for the largest Wmin(dk) over all possible archives a ∈ A . We write Wmin and maxWmin when
K  k.
2From our deﬁnition of integrity set, it is possible to delete e+1 blocks for every document in I without causing
damage outside I .
3What distinguishes the archives in A is which tangled blocks are selected for each document.
4See Footnote 3.
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From Figure 2.2b, we can see that the attack in red is optimal, thus Imin(d5)= 3 andWmin(d5)=
4. In fact, it is not hard to show that irrecoverably destroying any of the ﬁrst 5 documents of
the archive requires the deletion of blocks from at least three documents in a window of size at
least 4, thus Imin(d5)= 3 and Wmin(d5)= 4. Imin(d6)= 2 since d6 can be destroyed by deleting
the blocks {16,17,18,26} in documents d6 and d9.
The challenging part of our approach is thus to choose the pointers to entangled blocks in a
practicable way that provides good anti-tampering and data integrity. With a non-constant
number of pointers per document, maximum forward data integrity and anti-tampering is
possible: on an archive with s = 1 and e ≥ 1, one can use k−1 entangled blocks for document
dk , more precisely a pointer to the ﬁrst parity block of each of the k−1 documents already
archived. If a censor wants to delete a document dk irrecoverably, it must corrupt all the
documents archived after dk . Of course, the number of pointers to tangled blocks in this
example grows linearly with the number of documents, which makes encoding and decoding
too complex to be of any practical value. Since we target practically implementable data
integrity and anti-tampering, we thus focus on archives with t constant and small.
2.4 Reconstruction algorithm
One of the interesting aspects of our approach is its asymmetry: while impossible for an at-
tacker to ﬁnd the optimal strategy to irrecoverably tamper a target document dk in polynomial
time (unless P=NP), repairing the system if the damage done is recoverable is easy and doable
in linear time, as shown in Algorithm 1. The idea is ﬁrst to scan the archive and build the setC
of corrupted documents with at most e erased blocks. We can then take any document d inC ,
remove it fromC , decode it, recover its erased blocks, and updateC by adding the corrupted
documents, if any, that previously had strictly more than e erased blocks but that now have
at most e. The algorithm stops when C is empty, at which point either all the erased blocks
are recovered or all the remaining corrupted documents have more than e erased blocks. The
following lemma is straightforward.
Lemma 5. Let B be the set of erased blocks, andC the corresponding set of corrupted documents.
The set of documents R irrecoverable by the reconstruction algorithm is the largest integrity set
I ⊆C whose set of erased blocks is a subset of B.
Proof. By design of the reconstruction algorithm, R is an integrity set whose set of erased
blocks is a subset of B . It is clear that R ⊇ I because the reconstruction will never be able to
recover any document in I . It is also clear that R ⊆ I , otherwise R∪ I , which is an integrity set
whose set of erased blocks is a subset of B , would be larger than I .
In Figure 2.2a, the reconstruction algorithm can recover all the erased blocks, whereas in
Figure 2.2b it can recover the yellow blocks {2,7,11} but is incapable to recover the red blocks
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Algorithm 1: Reconstruction algorithm
input : e ← erasure decoding capability of the code
C ← set of corrupted documents in the archive
1 while C =  do
2 pick an element d ∈C
3 decode d and recover its set of erased blocks B
4 forall the archived documents d ′ with at least one block in B do
5 if d ′ is corrupted and has at most e erased blocks then
6 C ←C ∪ {d ′}
7 C ←C \ {d}
Figure 2.3 – (1,2,1,2)-archive with dependency cycle.
{13,14,15,20,21,22,24}. The algorithm is highly parallelizable: in Figure 2.2a, it can recover
blocks {2,7,11,14,15} in parallel, after which it recovers Block 13 in a second step.
In certain cases, it is possible to recover the documents in an integrity set with more than
e erased blocks per document. Consider the small section of a (1,2,1,2)-archive shown in
Figure 2.3. If an attacker erases Blocks {1,2,4}, none of the three documents can be decoded
and recovered by itself. However, we can easily ﬁnd a code (linear or nonlinear) such that
there is only one solution for the three erased blocks that results in three valid codewords. This
occurred because Blocks {1,2,4} form a dependency cycle between the three documents and
the attacker only erased blocks belonging to that cycle. However, even if there is only one solu-
tion for each erased block, the reconstruction algorithm will fail and reconstruction codeword
per codeword in not possible. Furthermore, a single erased block that is not constrained by
other documents is sufﬁcient to ensure multiple solutions. In Figure 2.3, the attacker could
also have erased Block 3, which breaks the dependency cycle by adding a degree of freedom.
2.5 Optimal attack
The most natural way to represent a (s, t ,e,p)-archive is as a (t + p)-uniform hypergraph
H∗ = (V ∗,E∗), where the set of verticesV ∗ is the set of all archived blocks, and each document
dk corresponds to an hyperedge in E
∗. However, the dual (t+p)-regular hypergraph H = (V ,E )
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is more conducive to analysis, thus it is the model used in this section. In this setting, the set
of vertices V is the set of all archived documents, and each archived block corresponds to an
hyperedge in E . Finding the best attack to censor a document dk irrecoverably corresponds to
ﬁnding the minimum subhypergraph V ′ of minimum degree at least e+1 containing dk . This
subhypergraph V ′ corresponds to the smallest integrity set Imin(dk ).
For simple undirected graphs, the problem of ﬁnding the minimum subgraph of minimum
degree ≥ d (MSMDd), also called d-girth, has a long history starting from the work of Erdo˝s
et al. [EFRS90] and Bollobás and Brightwell [BB89]. More recently, [APP+12] proved that for
d ≥ 3, MSMDd is NP-hard and cannot be approximated within a constant factor in polyno-
mial time if P =NP. This was improved in [PSS13], where the authors showed that for d ≥ 3
and > 0 there is no polynomial-time algorithm with approximation ratio 2O (log1−n) unless
NP⊆DTIME
(
2O (log
1−n)
)
, even with graphs with degree d or d +1. The authors also presented
a polynomial-time randomized approximation algorithm with ratio O
(
n
logn
)
, and a brute-force
polynomial-time deterministic approximation algorithm of ratio O
(
n logn
loglogn
)
for low-degree
graphs. The parametrized complexity of the d-girth problem was studied in [ASS12], where
the authors proved that the problem is W[1]-hard5 for general graphs, but ﬁxed-parameter
tractable when graphs have bounded local tree width. From the discussion in [PSS13], opti-
mization of the d-girth problem for d ≥ 3 appears very hard, in the vein of other very hard
problems to approximate like maximum clique, chromatic number and longest path. However,
we note that for d = 2, the problem is the standard girth of a graph and corresponds to the
length of its shortest cycle, which is solvable efﬁciently by dynamic programming.
In this section, we consider a target document dk archived long enough, i.e., with K  k
documents archived after it. We mention that for general hypergraphs, contrary to graphs,
the 2-girth problem seems difﬁcult as well, however we show that under certain conditions,
there exists a polynomial-time algorithm for the optimal attack on (s, t ,e,p)-archives with
e = 1. To prove this result, we present a polynomial-time algorithm to calculate the 2-girth of
multigraphs with loops, which appears to be new. We then show, using a reduction to the e+1-
girth problem, that for e ≥ 2 and t ≥ e+2, ﬁnding the optimal attack targeting document dk is
NP-hard, impossible to approximate within a constant factor in polynomial time if P =NP,
and impossible to approximate with ratio 2O (log
1−n) unless NP⊆DTIME
(
2O (log
1−n)
)
.
Lemma 6. There exists a polynomial-time algorithm to calculate the 2-girth of a multigraph
with loops.
Proof. Let G = (V ,E) be a multigraph with loops. We consider the size g2 of the minimum
subgraph of minimum degree at least two that includes a target vertex dk . We can ﬁnd the
2-girth over the multigraph by repeating the algorithm for all vertices. Furthermore, although
we omit the details, the vertices of the smallest subgraph can be found by keeping track of the
vertices in optimal paths during the execution of the algorithm.
5Consult [FG06] for a formal deﬁnition.
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(a) 2 loops at dk .
(b) Parallel edges from dk .
(c) dk part of a cycle.
(d) dk in the middle of a simple path ending at both sides with a
cycle, a loop or parallel edges.
(e) dk with a loop on one side of a simple path ending at the other
side with a cycle, a loop or parallel edges.
Figure 2.4 – Types of minimum subgraphs of minimum degree at least 2 in a multigraph with
loops.
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The ﬁve types of minimum subgraphs of minimum degree at least 2 in a multigraph with loops
are shown in Figure 2.4. If the multigraph has two loops at dk (Fig. 2.4a), then g2 = 1. If the
multigraph has less than two loops at dk but parallel edges from dk (Fig. 2.4b), then g2 = 2. If
none of the ﬁrst two cases applies, then g2 =min(g c2 ,gd2 ,g e2), where g c2 is the smallest cycle
including dk (Fig. 2.4c), which can be found in polynomial time using dynamic programming,
gd2 is the smallest simple path including dk in the middle and ending at both sides with a cycle,
a loop, or parallel edges (Fig. 2.4d), and g e2 is the smallest path such that dk has a loop on one
side of a simple path ending at the other side with a cycle, a loop or parallel edges (Fig. 2.4e).
We now present Algorithm 2, a polynomial-time algorithm to calculate min(gd2 ,g
e
2) when some
vertices can be traversed more than once. The algorithm calculates the smallest path starting
Algorithm 2: MSMD2 with repeated vertices (Types 2.4d and 2.4e)
input :Vi (dk )← the set of incident vertices to target vertex dk // dk ∉Vi (dk ) even if dk has a loop
output :min(gd2 ,g
e
2 )
1 forall the vi ∈Vi (dk ) do
2 forall the v ∈V \ {dk ∪ vi } do
3 p(vi ,v)← length of shortest path from vi to v
4 p(vi ,vi )← 0
5 forall the v ∈V \ {dk } do
6 c(v)← length of shortest cycle including v
// The shortest cycle can be a loop or parallel edges if present
7 if there is no loop at dk then
8 return min
vi1 ,vi2∈Vi
vi1 =vi2
v1,v2∈V \{dk }
(p(vi1 ,v1)+c(v1)+p(vi2 ,v2)+c(v2)+1)
9 else
10 return min
vi1∈Vi
v1∈V \{dk }
(p(vi1 ,v1)+c(v1)+1)
from each vertex incident to dk that ends with a cycle, a loop, or parallel edges, and does not
pass through dk . It returns the length of the smallest such path if dk has a loop (Type 2.4e),
and the sum of the two smallest such paths if dk is in the middle of the path (Type 2.4d). For
Type 2.4d, the algorithm does not verify that the two smallest paths are disjoint. However, if
they are not disjoint, it implies that dk is part of a cycle smaller than g
e
2 , a case that is accounted
for when calculating the smallest cycle including dk (Type 2.4c). We conclude the proof by
pointing out that all the steps of Algorithm 2 are executed in polynomial time.
Corollary 7. If each block of a (s, t ,1,p)-archive belongs to at most two documents, then there
is a polynomial-time algorithm to ﬁnd the smallest integrity set containing document dk.
Proof. If each block belongs to at most two documents, then each hyperedge has one or two
vertices, thus the hypergraph is a multigraph with loops. Since e = 1, the smallest integrity set
of this multigraph is its 2-girth which from Lemma 6 can be found in polynomial time.
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Figure 2.5 – Polynomial reduction from Imin(dk ) to the e+1-girth problem: incidence matrix
for the top of the archive.
Theorem 8. Let  > 0, and consider a (s, t ,e,p)-archive with e ≥ 2, t ≥ e + 2, and K  k
documents archived after a target document dk. Finding Imin(dk) is NP-hard. Furthermore,
approximating Imin(dk ) within constant factor in polynomial time is impossible if P =NP, and
approximating Imin(dk ) with approximation ratio 2
O (log1− k) in polynomial time is impossible
unless NP⊆DTIME
(
2O (log
1− k)
)
.
Proof. Let G = (V ,E) be a graph with n vertices all of degree e +1 or e +2, and whose e +1-
girth is δ. We prove the theorem by reducing the smallest integrity set problem to ﬁnding
the (e + 1)-girth of G , which is NP−hard and hard to approximate in polynomial time if
e ≥ 2 [APP+12, PSS13]. To be precise, we reduce our problem to the (e+1)-girth problem that
includes a vertex v1 ∈V . This problem is as hard as the original e+1-girth, otherwise we could
solve it n times for the n vertices and solve the original problem. From the constraints of the
graph, we can bound the e+1-girth by e+2≤ δ≤n. This graph has at most n(e+2)2 ≤ne edges.
We represent G using an incidence matrix Mn×ne , where each row identiﬁes with a vertex,
each column with an edge, and mi j = 1 if vertex vi and edge e j are incident, and 0 otherwise.
Each row of M has either e+1 or e+2 ones.
We construct a (s, t ,e,p)−archive A from M , represented as the incidence matrix of its un-
derlying hypergraph. Figure 2.5 shows the incidence matrix of the top of the archive. Each
row represents a document (vertex), and each column a block (hyperedge). Element ai j = 1
if block bj belongs to document di , and 0 otherwise. The archive has p archived blocks per
document, and t bootstrap anchor blocks. The top of the archive has n(e+1) documents. For
each of the ﬁrst ne documents, the t entangled blocks point to the t anchors (the big green
block 1ne×t at the top-left of the ﬁgure). For documents dne+1 to dn(e+1), we split the matrix
M in columns m1,m2, . . . ,mne , and use mi as part of the hyperedge of the ﬁrst parity block
of di for i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,ne} (blue vertical rectangles in Figure 2.5). Since we need t pointers per
document, we add t−e−2 pointers to the ﬁrst t−e−2 anchors for documents dne+1 to dn(e+1),
which explains our assumption that t ≥ e+2 (the green block 1ne×(t−e−2) at the bottom-left
of the ﬁgure). Since the degree of the vertices of G is e +1 or e +2, we add a pointer to the
last anchor block for document dne+i if vi ∈V has degree e+1 (pink block in the ﬁgure). This
ensures that each document has exactly t pointers.
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Figure 2.6 – Polynomial reduction from Imin(dk ) to the e+1-girth problem: incidence matrix
for the entire archive.
Figure 2.6 shows the incidence matrix of the entire archive, which we extend by adding npt +1
blocks 1n(e+1)×t of pointers and a sufﬁcient number of documents to cover all such blocks. The
ﬁrst such block points to the t anchor blocks, and we cascade the other npt  blocks under the
parity blocks of documents dne+1 to dn(e+1). The number of archived documents is therefore
n(e+1) ·
(⌈np
t
⌉
+2
)
∈O (n2). (2.1)
We now explain the motivation behind all these gadgets. We want to ﬁnd Imin(dk) where
dk  dne+1. We can erase all the parity blocks from documents d1 to dne . This corresponds
to the integrity region inside the thick border in Figure 2.6. It is clear that we erased at least
e+1 blocks per document from d1 to dn(e+1), and no block in the other documents. Hence,
Imin(dk) ≤ n(e +1). By construction, all the blocks outside the integrity region are used in
at least n(e +1)+1 documents, thus none of them can be part of the smallest integrity set
containing dk . We can therefore limit our search for the smallest integrity set inside the
integrity region.
We now reduce Imin(dk ) to the (e+1)-girth ofG . Assume without loss of generality that there
is exactly one smallest subgraph H , of size δ, of minimum degree at least e +1 in G . This
minimum subgraph H has at most δ·(e+2)2 edges. By construction of the archive, it follows that
we can form an integrity set by erasing the blocks corresponding to edges in the minimum
subgraph. This erases one document per vertex in H (dne+i is erased if and only vi is in H),
and also erases one document per edge in H (di is erased if and only ei is in H). Thus,
Imin(dk )≤ δ+
δ · (e+2)
2
≤ δ
(
1+ e+2
2
)
.
(2.2)
It is not possible for an integrity set of dk to contain less than δ documents between dne+1
and dn(e+1), because it would imply that the (e+1)-girth ofG is smaller than δ. The smallest
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subgraph H has at least δ(e+1)2 edges. By construction, it means that the smallest integrity set
must include at least δ(e+1)2 blocks in δ+ δ(e+1)2 documents (one erased document for each
edge and vertex in H), thus
Imin(dk )≥ δ+
δ · (e+1)
2
= δ
(
1+ e+1
2
)
.
(2.3)
Putting (2.2) and (2.3) together and solving for δ, we obtain
Imin(dk )
1+ e+22
≤ δ≤ Imin(dk )
1+ e+12
. (2.4)
Hence, if we could calculate Imin(dk ) in polynomial time, we could also approximate δwithin a
constant factor in polynomial time, which is not possible if P =NP. Thus, calculating Imin(dk )
is NP-hard. Furthermore, if we could approximate Imin(dk ) in polynomial time, we could also
approximate δ in polynomial time. The approximation hardness results from [APP+12, PSS13]
therefore also apply to our problem.
We complete the proof by mentioning that ﬁnding Imin(dk ) for 1≤ k < ne+1 is also hard. The
proof uses the same construction, but reduces Imin(dk ) to the d-girth problem such that the
smallest subgraph must contain a speciﬁc edge. This forces the erasure of the parity block of
dk that contains the edge. Without this condition, if the edge incident to dk is not in H , then
Imin(dk )= 1.
We mention to conclude this section that verifying that a set of documents is an integrity set is
in P from the reconstruction algorithm, hence ﬁnding Imin(dk ) is NP-complete.
2.6 Suboptimal attacks
Because we do not know any good polynomial-time algorithms to optimally solve the girth
problem relevant to attacking our system (or even to ﬁnd a good approximative solution), we
turn to more speciﬁc techniques, taking the special structure of our archive into account. In
this section we consider several linear-time heuristics, and use them in later sections to study
entanglement strategies.
All the heuristics formulate the attack as a search problem on a tree of partial solutions. A
partial solution consists of a set of target documents we are currently committed to destroy,
and a set of erased blocks. A solution is complete if the set of erased blocks is sufﬁcient to
make the target document set irrecoverable, more precisely an integrity set with at least e+1
erased blocks per document. A partial solution must be completed by deleting some blocks
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referenced by recoverable documents. To make sure the target document set is not recoverable,
no destroyed blocks must be referenced by documents outside of the target set; every time we
choose to destroy a new block, we must commit to destroy all documents referencing it.
From a partial solution, every possible choice of new blocks to erase gives a new partial (or
possibly complete) solution, forming a tree of solutions. For the initial solution, we take the
set of documents to censor, along with a (yet) empty set of erased blocks.
Observe that, except at the start of the algorithm, the target set can be unambiguously com-
puted from the set of erased blocks. Thus, the tree is ﬁnite (and is, in fact, a lattice rather than
a tree, as two different paths may lead to the same partial solution, differing only in order of
processing). This lattice is ﬁnite, having at its other extremity the worst case where the entire
system has been erased.
2.6.1 Greedy Attacks
The simplest way to explore this lattice is with a greedy algorithm. We iteratively walk down the
lattice of solutions along a single path, eventually reaching a complete solution. The greedy
attack framework is described in Algorithm 3. For convenience, we maintain the setC of all
corrupted targets and the set R of corrupted but decodable targets. The attack is complete
when R becomes empty, at which point all the documents inC are irrecoverable. Until then,
we iterate over R in chronological order, and for each document in it, we erase the minimal6
number of blocks required to make the processed document impossible to directly decode. As
there will most of the time be more candidate blocks for deletion than the minimum required,
we use one of four simple heuristics to choose the blocks to delete. This leads to four variants
of a greedy attack: minimum attack, leaping attack, creeping attack, and tailored attack.
Minimum Attack
The minimum attack, described in Function 4, minimizes the setC of corrupted target docu-
ments, by always prefering blocks that are referenced by the least amount of documents not
already in the target set.
Leaping Attack
The leaping attack, described in Function 5, is based on the intuition that it is easier to
attack recent documents than older ones. We show in Section 2.8 that the leaping attack is
especially suitable to damage a system built using an uniform random selection of pointers.
The score of each block is the timestamp of the oldest document in C to reference it, with
higher timestamps more desirable. Intuitively, we try to leap over documents by moving
min(R) forward in time as fast as possible toward the end of the archive. When all documents
6as dictated by the code parameters, and the number of blocks already erased in earlier steps
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Algorithm 3: Greedy Attack Framework
input :k ← the index of the target document
e ← erasure decoding capability of the code
output :B // set of erased blocks making dk irrecoverable
note :documents(b) is the set of documents with b as a block
1 R ← {k} // Corrupted but decodable targets
2 C ← {k} // All corrupted targets
3 B ← // Erased blocks
4 while R =  do
5 r ←min(R)
6 while dr has less than e+1 erased blocks do
7 score ←
8 forall the blocks b not erased in dr do
9 score[b]← heuristic(C ,B ,b)
// Available heuristics:
// MinimumAttack, LeapingAttack,
// CreepingAttack, TailoredAttack
10 b ← argmin
b
score[b]
11 B ←B ∪ {b}
12 R ←R∪ (documents(b) \C )
13 C ←C ∪documents(b)
14 R ←R\{r }
15 return B
Function 4: MinimumAttack(C ,B ,b)
1 return |C ∪documents(b)|
referencing a block are already in C , the block score is the minimum of an empty set of
integers, which we take as inﬁnity. In this case, the block is free and can thus be erased without
propagation to uncorrupted documents. Thus, free blocks are always erased in priority (free
blocks are implicitly deleted in priority for the minimum attack as well).
Observe that a document can always be made undecodable by deleting all its parity blocks,
without having to delete any pointers. This is because, as deﬁned in Section 2.3, the amount
of parity blocks p is strictly greater than the number of correctible errors e, unless in the
degenerate case s = 0 where the system would not be able to store any new information.
Also, the oldest document referencing a block is always the primary document of this block. It
follows that with the leaping heuristic, parity blocks are always favored over pointers unless all
the older documents using a pointed block are already inC .
Function 5: LeapingAttack(C ,B ,b)
1 N ← documents(b) \C
2 if N = then
3 return −∞ ; // free block
4 else
5 Return 0−min(N )
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Creeping Attack
The creeping attack, described in Function 6, intuitively tries to keep the set of corrupted
documentsC as compact as possible in time. We will see in Section 2.7 that the creeping attack
is effective against window-based entanglement strategies. The creeping attack is similar in
essence to the dual of the leaping attack. However, simply mirroring the min-max behavior
of the leaping attack does not give a useful algorithm, as it can cause C to grow fast and far
in the past. We could explicitly forbid the algorithm from targeting documents older than
the initial target (this constraint is implicit in the leaping attack), but instead we address
this shortcoming by minimizing the range of C . Although this is not explicitly written in
the algorithm, when two blocks have the same cost, the algorithm erases the block with the
smallest |C ′|. Thus, as for the leaping attack, the free blocks that do not propagate to other
documents are erased in priority.
Function 6: CreepingAttack(C ,B ,b)
1 C ′ ←C ∪documents(b)
2 return max(C ′)−min(C ′)
Tailored Attack
Although we study pointers selected uniformly at random in Section 2.8, here we brieﬂy
mention that we can calculate the expected number of times a parity block is used as a
pointer by younger documents (Lemma 14). This allows us to estimate, when we erase a
block, the propagation of the attack to all the documents used by that block. This attack,
tailored to uniformly random entanglement, is described in Function 7 and further discussed
in Section 2.8.
Function 7: TailoredAttack(C ,B ,b)
input : t ; // Number of pointers per document
input :K ; // Number of archived documents
note :documents(b) is the set of documents with b as a block
blocks(c) is the set of blocks of document dc
1 cost← 0
2 B ′ =B ∪b
3 C ′ =C ∪documents(b)
4 forall the c ∈C ′ do
5 yettoerase=max(0,e+1−|B ′ ∩blocks(c)|)
6 cost← cost+1+yettoerase · ln
(
1+ K−cc
)t
7 return cost
2.6.2 Depth-ﬁrst search
The greedy algorithms are fast since their complexity is linear in the number of archived
documents. We implemented a recursive depth-ﬁrst search over the tree of partial solutions
using our four heuristics. The ﬁrst complete solution produced always matches the output of
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Figure 2.7 – Trace of the depth-ﬁrst search leaping attacks for twelve (1,3,2,3)−archives with
104 documents, target document d103 and pointers chosen uniformly at random. The algo-
rithm traversed the entire tree in ≈ 104 seconds in the worst case.
the greedy attack. The tree is then backtracked, looking for smaller integrity sets. Since the
cost function |C | is nondecreasing as we go down the tree, we can perform branch pruning as
soon as the partial cost exceeds the cost of the currently best known solution.
This algorithm thus offers a tradeoff between time and solution quality, at the expense of
increased memory usage. Figure 2.7 shows the progression of solution quality over time for
twelve randomly selected archives. Unfortunately, as shown in this sample run, even with
pruning depth-ﬁrst search is expensive and does not always progress to the optimal solution
quickly. Solution quality7 is not proportional to the time spent attacking. Instead, the solution
improves in unpredictible large steps. Intuitively, this can be explained by the fact that more
recent documents are less protected, and much easier to attack. By searching depth-ﬁrst, we
spend a lot of effort trying to optimize the later stages of the attack, which may already be
close to optimal, whereas the decisions with the most impact on the overall cost are the ones
taken at the beginning of the attack.
7as the inverse of the size of the integrity set.
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2.6.3 Bounded breadth-ﬁrst search
The inefﬁciency of depth-ﬁrst search motivates the investigation of bounded breadth-ﬁrst
search algorithm. For large systems, it is impossible to traverse the entire solution tree,
and bounded breadth-ﬁrst search algorithms converge much faster than depth-ﬁrst search
protocols. We thus keep a collection of partial attack states, ranked according to some of our
heuristics, and expand the most promising partial solutions ﬁrst. We expand all the partial
solutions into their child states at once, then only retain the best ones, up to the selected
buffer size. We thus deal with a series of sets of solutions, for which all solutions in the same
set are located at the same depth in the tree. This simpliﬁes the analysis of the behavior: we
can enforce a constant maximum width, for all depths, on the subtree we are exploring. We
cannot apply the same pruning strategy as in the depth-ﬁrst search, because no complete
solution is known before the end of a run, but we can control how much time we spend in the
most critical part of the search tree.
2.6.4 Performance evaluation
In order to measure the effectiveness of our attacks and reconstruction algorithm, we simu-
lated a storage system. The simulation keeps track of the dependencies between hypothetical
blocks and documents, and the state (healthy or erased) of the data blocks. Recovery is per-
formed according to Algorithm 1 by assuming an MDS code of given parameters; no actual
data storage or decoding is performed.
2.7 Proximity entanglement
When a document is not being pointed to, it can always be tamperedwith, without propagation.
Thus, it makes sense to ensure that a new document will be quickly pointed to. A potential
solution is to choose the entangled blocks using a sliding window bounding the pointers to
documents in the recent past. We show in this section that this approach has the drawback that
an attacker can irrecoverably tamper documents, with an efﬁcient attack to do so, concentrated
over the close vicinity of the target document.
Deﬁnition 9. We deﬁne the entangled and parity blocks of document dk for a (s, t ,e,p)-archive
as
dk  (t1k , t
2
k , . . . t
t
k ,b
1
k ,b
2
k , . . . ,b
p
k ). (2.5)
Consider a (s, t ,e,p)-archive with a sliding window of size w . In other words, the pointers
in document dk do not point to documents older than dk−w . The ﬁrst thing to consider is
the number of pointers per document. If t < p, in other words if the number of pointers per
document is smaller than the number of archived blocks per document, then with a sliding
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window some blocks will never be pointed to. These unprotected blocks can thus be deleted
without propagation to blocks from other documents. If t = 1, for instance, then maxImin = 2
and maxWmin =w+1. This can be achieved, for instance, by taking the single entangled block of
document dk from the parity blocks of document dk−w . Using this structure, an attacker who
wants to delete dk irrecoverably can do so by deleting the parity blocks dk and the unprotected
parity blocks of dk+w . It is possible to obtain a larger minimum integrity set and/or a larger
minimum integrity window for some documents, but in this case other documents will remain
completely unprotected.
We now increase the number of pointers per document to t = p and organize the pointers so
that every block is pointed to at most once. We show with the next lemma that the size of the
best integrity windows increase but remains bounded.
Lemma 10. Consider a (s, t ,e,p)-archive with p ≥ 3, t = p, a sliding window of size w > p, and
such that every block in the archive is pointed to at most once. Then,
2w −p+1≤maxWmin ≤ 2w.
Proof. We ﬁrst prove the upper bound. If there are less than 2w −1 documents archived after
dk , then the parity blocks from dk and the documents that follow can be erased. If there are
more than 2w −1 documents archived after dk , then we erase the parity blocks in documents
dk to dk+w−1 and erase the tangled blocks (pointers) in documents dk+w to dk+2w−1. There
are at least p > e erased blocks per document, and the code can only correct e block erasures
per codeword. From the sliding window, none of the erased blocks from the ﬁrst w documents
are pointed by a document newer than dk+2w−1, and none of the erased pointers from the
last w documents points to documents older than dk . To complete the proof, we observe that
some of the pointers from the last w documents might also point to parity blocks from other
documents among the last w , but these parity blocks cannot be at the same time pointed
to by documents newer than dk+2w−1 because we assumed that every block in the archive is
pointed to at most once. Hence, maxImin ≤maxWmin ≤ 2w
For the lower bound, we construct (s, t ,e,p)-archives with s = 1. Let b1k ,b2k , . . . ,b
p
k be the parity
blocks of document dk . For every k, the entangled blocks of dk are set to t
i
k = bik−w+i−1 for
i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,p − 1} and t pk = b
p
k−1. We set b
i
j  ba when j < 1, thus for the ﬁrst w archived
documents, some of the entangled blocks point to an anchor block ba . It should be clear that
every parity block of dk will eventually be pointed to exactly once after w additional blocks
have been archived.
Since the entanglement structure is the same for every document dk , we can without loss
of generality attack dk by tampering with documents archived after dk . Thus, to erase
dk , its p parity blocks must be erased. These parity blocks are used in blocks dk+1 and
dk+w−p+2,dk+w−p+3, . . . ,dk+w−1,dk+w , which must be destroyed.
Consider now block dk+w−p+1; we show that we achieve the lower bound whether we erase it
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or not.
If dk+w−p+1 is erased, then the entangled block to document dk+w−p can be erased, but the
other entangled blocks come from documents older than dk and must be kept. That leaves
p−1 parity blocks that must be deleted. The parity blocks of document dk+w−p+1 are pointed
to by blocks in documents dk+w−p+2 and
dk+w−p+2+w−p+1,dk+w−p+2+w−p+2, . . . ,
dk+w−p+2+w−2,dk+w−p+2+w−1.
By taking the ﬁrst p − 1 such blocks, the smallest integrity window for dk must contain a
document at least as recent as dk+w−p+2+w−2 = dk+2w−p .
If dk+w−p+1 is not erased, then the pointer from document dk+w−p+2 to document dk+w−p+1
cannot be erased, but since dk+w−p+2 is erased, p of its other blocks must be erased. Its pointer
to dk is already erased, but its other entangled blocks come from documents older than dk
and must be kept. We must thus erase p−1 of its parity blocks, thus a document as least as
new as dk+w−p+2+w−1 = dk+2w−p+1 must be erased.
Hence,
Wmin(dk )≥min(2w −p+1,2w −p+2)= 2w −p+1. (2.6)
Since the integrity is the same for every old enough document, we conclude that
maxWmin ≥Wmin(dk )≥ 2w −p+1. (2.7)
Surprisingly, having more than p entangled blocks per document does not appear to provide
more integrity, and even becomes harmful as t increases, as shown next.
Lemma11. Consider a (s, t ,e,p)-archivewith a slidingwindowof size w and t = p·w entangled
blocks per document. Then,
maxImin =maxWmin =w +1.
Proof. Since t = p ·w , the entangled blocks of every document must point to every parity block
of every document in its sliding window. For the ﬁrst w archived documents, the entangled
blocks that should be pointing to documents that do not exist do instead point to an anchor
block. Since the entanglement structure is the same for every document dk , we can without
loss of generality attack dk by tampering with documents archived after dk . Thus, to erase dk ,
e+1 of its p parity blocks must be erased. Since every block in dk in used as an entanglement
block in documents dk+1, . . . ,dk+w , this is sufﬁcient to erase dk irrecoverably.
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If w is small, a malicious customer is capable of censoring a newly archived document dk at
anytime in the future by archiving 2w −1 junk documents immediately after dk . Allowing
several pointers to point to the same parity block does not appear make this attack more
difﬁcult: if the pointers are bounded to w documents in the past, then the anti-tampering
protection is also bounded.
2.7.1 Random entanglement within a sliding window
With a small sliding window, we can explore the search tree exhaustively. To illustrate the
previous results, Figure 2.8 shows the result of the optimal attack over (1, t ,2,3)-archives with
105 documents, t ∈ {1,2, . . . ,30} and entangled blocks chosen at random in a sliding window of
size w = 10. The attack targets document d1000. For each value of t , the ﬁgures show a box-
and-whisker8 plot for 1000 simulations. Figure 2.8a shows how the integrity sets vary, whereas
Figure 2.8b focuses on the integrity windows. The green squares in Figure 2.8a represent
the best regular entanglement within the window (see Section 2.7.2). The ﬁgures illustrate
Lemmas 10 and 11: the median integrity size (integrity window) ﬁrst increases quickly and
then decreases to Wmin(d1000)= Imin(d1000)=w +1= 11 as the number of pointers increases.
The large maximal integrity windows for small t do not contradict the lemmas, because our
optimal algorithm minimizes the size of the integrity set without considering the integrity
window.
Figure 2.9 shows the result of min
990≤k≤1010
Imin(dk) with the same simulation parameters. The
attack sequentially targets di for 990≤ i ≤ 1010, and shows the size of the smallest integrity set
among the targeted documents. Compared to Figure 2.8, we can see that with few pointers,
the probability that one of the documents in the interval is weakly protected is high. As the
number of pointers increases, the protection from document to document becomes more
uniform, and Figures 2.8 and 2.9 have the same behavior.
Figures 2.10 and 2.11 respectively show the result of the creeping and leaping attacks for
the same system parameters, respectively. It shows the general efﬁciency of the creeping
attack, and the inefﬁciency of the leaping attack when t is small. With large t , however, the
randomness in pointer selection disappears and both greedy attacks behave like the optimal
attack.
2.7.2 Regular entanglement within a sliding window
Instead of choosing the pointers randomly within the sliding window, we can use the same
entanglement structure for each document. We call this strategy regular entanglement. For
8Showing the minimum, ﬁrst quartile, median (in blue), third quartile, interquartile range (in orange) and
maximum across all simulation runs.
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(a) Size of the smallest integrity set Imin(d1000). The green squares represent the size of the smallest
integrity sets for the best regular entanglement within the window (see Section 2.7.2).
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
0
10
20
30
40
Number of entangeld blocks t
S
iz
e
of
in
te
gr
ity
w
in
do
w
(b) Size of the integrity windows for the integrity sets found in Figure 2.8a.
Figure 2.8 – Optimal attack for 1000 (1, t ,2,3)-archives with a sliding window of size w = 10
and t ∈ {1,2, . . . ,30}. The archive contains 105 documents, and the attack targets d1000. The
box-and-whisker plots show the minimum, ﬁrst quartile, median (in blue), third quartile,
interquartile range (in orange) and maximum across all simulation runs.
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(a) Distribution of min
990≤k≤1010
Imin(dk ). The green squares represent the size of the smallest integrity sets
for the best regular entanglement within the window (see Section 2.7.2).
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(b) Size distribution of the sliding windows for the integrity sets found in Figure 2.9a.
Figure 2.9 – Optimal attack for 1000 (1, t ,2,3)-archives with a sliding window of size w = 10
and t ∈ {1,2, . . . ,30}. The archive contains 105 documents.34
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(a) Size of the smallest integrity set Imin(d1000).
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(b) Size of the integrity windows W (d1000) for the integrity sets found in Figure 2.10a.
Figure 2.10 – Creeping attack for 1000 (1, t ,2,3)-archives with a sliding window of size w = 10
and t ∈ {1,2, . . . ,30}. The archive contains 105 documents, and the attack targets d1000.
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(a) Size of the smallest integrity set Imin(d1000).
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(b) Size of the integrity windows W (d1000) for the integrity sets found in Figure 2.11a.
Figure 2.11 – Leaping attack for 1000 (1, t ,2,3)-archives with a sliding window of size w = 10
and t ∈ {1,2, . . . ,30}. The archive contains 105 documents, and the attack targets d1000.
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instance, with t = 3 pointers and a sliding window of size w = 10, the regular structure
(t1k  b
1
k−1, t
2
k  b
2
k−3, t
3
k  b
3
k−10) (2.8)
gives maxImin = 8, i.e., the smallest integrity set of any document archived long enough has
size eight. This is the best regular structure for (1,3,2,3)-archives and w = 10, although it is
not unique. The green squares in Figures 2.8a and 2.9a show the size of the smallest integrity
sets for the best regular entanglement structures for (1,3,2,3)-archives as the number of
pointers per document increases from 1 to 30. The light green squares are lower bounds since
we did not explore all the possible regular structures for the corresponding values of t . In
this example, regular entanglement is more robust than random entanglement with a small
number of pointers, but with a lot of pointers both strategies are equivalent. We mention to
conclude this section that the creeping attack always works well for regular entanglement
within a sliding window. The leaping attack, however, performs poorly and will generally
propagate from the target document to the end of the archive.
2.8 Random entanglement
In this section, we study the impact of uniformly random entanglement. In practice, choosing
entangled blocks uniformly at random offers two important advantages over highly structured
entanglement. First, a structure with randomness prevents the attacker from planning the
attack in advance, for instance by using amortized cost expensive pre-computations tied to
the system structure. Second, a deterministic structure is harder to implement and maintain
in real-time in a large-scale distributed setting. Conversely, uniformly random entanglement
has two drawbacks. The ﬁrst is that it takes an increasingly longer time to protect young
documents as the archive increases. The second drawback, as illustrated in the previous
section, is that structured entanglement within a sliding window is much more robust than
random entanglement.
Uniformly random entanglement is well-suited for mathematical analysis. We ﬁrst show a
phase transition for the leaping attack as the number of pointers reaches a threshold. Passed
that threshold, an attacker who wants to erase a document must corrupt a constant fraction of
all documents archived after it. We then provide numerical evidence and conjecture that this
phase transition exists for the optimal attack, although the proof has eluded us so far.
Suppose that we want to censor document dk on a (s, t ,e,p)-archive by deleting parity blocks
from it. Let Li > k be deﬁned such that dLi is the i -th document having a pointer to any of the
parity blocks of dk for i ≥ 1. If the pointers to entangled blocks are assigned randomly among
all the blocks already archived, then the following result can be established.
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Lemma 12. If the pointers for a (s, t ,e,p)-archive are chosen uniformly at random, then
E [Li ]=∞ if t = 1;
E [Li ]∼ k
(
1+ 1t−1
)i
if t > 1 and i ∈ o(k). (2.9)
Proof.
Case i = 1. We consider the random variable L′ ≥ 1 deﬁned as
L′ L1−k. (2.10)
Since dk+L′ is the ﬁrst document pointing to any of the parity blocks of dk , all the pointers
from documents dk+1 to dk+L′−1 cannot point to dk . It follows that
Pr[L′ = l ]=
(
k−1
k
)t
·
(
k
k+1
)t
· . . . ·
(
k+ l −3
k+ l −2
)t
·
(
1−
(
k+ l −2
k+ l −1
)t)
=
(
k−1
k+ l −2
)t (
1−
(
k+ l −2
k+ l −1
)t)
= (k−1)t ·
(
1
(k+ l −2)t −
1
(k+ l −1)t
)
(2.11)
The expectation of this random variable is
E [L′]=
∞∑
l=1
l ·Pr[L′ = l ]
= (k−1)t
∞∑
l=1
(
l
(k+ l −2)t −
l
(k+ l −1)t
)
= (k−1)t
∞∑
l=k−1
l−t .
(2.12)
The series diverges with t = 1, whereas when t > 1 we can bound E [L′] by
(k−1)t
∫∞
k−1
l−t dl ≤ E [L′]
≤ (k−1)t
∫∞
k−1
(l −1)−t dl
−(k−1)t · (k−1)
−t+1
−t +1 ≤ E [L
′]≤−(k−1)t · (k−2)
−t+1
−t +1
k−1
t −1 ≤ E [L
′]≤ k−1
t −1 ·
(
k−1
k−2
)t−1
.
(2.13)
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Using (2.13), we obtain
E [L′]∼ k
t −1 (2.14)
and from (2.10) we can conclude that
E [L1]∼ k
(
1+ 1
t −1
)
. (2.15)
Case i > 1. Since E [L1] =∞ when t = 1, it is clear that E [Li ] =∞ when t = 1 and i > 1 . For
t > 1, we prove the result by strong induction on i . Since the basis step was done for the case
i = 1, we can assume that the property is true for i = 1,2, . . . ,n and prove the property for n+1.
Using the iterated expectation, we can write
E [Ln+1]= E [E [Ln+1 | L1]]
= ∑
l1≥k+1
Pr[L1 = l1] ·E [Ln+1 | L1 = l1]. (2.16)
The quantity E [Ln+1 | L1 = l1] corresponds to the expected position of the (n+1)-th document
pointing to dk given that dl1 is the ﬁrst document pointing to it. Since the pointers are
chosen randomly, this is equivalent to the expected position of the n-th document pointing to
document dl1 . Since the property is true for i = n from the induction hypothesis, it follows
that
E [Ln+1]=
∑
l1≥k+1
Pr[L1 = l1] ·
[
l1 ·
(
1+ 1
t −1
)n
+o(k)
]
. (2.17)
As done in (2.10) for the case i = 1, we use the random variable L′ = L1−k and rewrite (2.17) as
E [Ln+1]=
∑
l≥1
Pr[L′ = l ] ·
[
(l +k) ·
(
1+ 1
t −1
)n
+o(k)
]
=
(
1+ 1
t −1
)n
E [L′]
+
[
k
(
1+ 1
t −1
)n
+o(k)
]∑
l≥1
Pr[L′ = l ].
(2.18)
where Pr[L′ = l ] is deﬁned as in (2.11).
From (2.14), the ﬁrst term of (2.18) can be written as
(
1+ 1
t −1
)n
E [L′]=
(
1+ 1
t −1
)n k
t −1 +o(k) (2.19)
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whereas from (2.11) the second term of (2.18) can be written as
[
k
(
1+ 1
t −1
)n
+o(k)
]∑
l≥1
Pr[L′ = l ]
=
[
k
(
1+ 1
t −1
)n
+o(k)
]
(k−1)t
·
∞∑
l=1
(
1
(k+ l −2)t −
1
(k+ l −1)t
)
= k
(
1+ 1
t −1
)n
+o(k).
(2.20)
Putting (2.19) and (2.20) together, we can conclude that
E [Ln+1]=
(
1+ 1
t −1
)n k
t −1 +k
(
1+ 1
t −1
)n
+o(k)
= k
(
1+ 1
t −1
)n ( 1
t −1 +1
)
+o(k)
= k
(
1+ 1
t −1
)n+1
+o(k)
∼ k
(
1+ 1
t −1
)n+1
.
(2.21)
Suppose now that we want to erase a chosen parity block b in document dk , and let us deﬁne
Mi > k such that dMi is the i -th document having a pointer to block b for i ≥ 1. With pointers
chosen uniformly at random, we obtain the following result.
Lemma 13. If the pointers for an (s, t ,e,p)-archive are chosen uniformly at random, then
E [Mi ]=∞ if t ≤ p;
E [Mi ]∼ k
(
1+ pt−p
)i
if t > p and i ∈ o(k). (2.22)
Proof. The lemma can be proved directly in a similar fashion as Lemma 12, although this
results in a rather cumbersome proof.
Instead, we prove the lemma when t is a multiple of p. For large enough k, the pointer
behavior of an archive with p parity blocks and t pointers per document, if t is a multiple of
p, is similar to the pointer behavior of an archive with 1 parity block and t ′ = tp pointers per
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document. Hence, from Lemma 12 we obtain
E [M1]∼ k
(
1+ 1
t ′ −1
)i
∼ k
(
1+ 1t
p −1
)i
∼ k
(
1+ p
t −p
)i
.
(2.23)
Let Nl , l > 0, be the number of documents having a pointer to a parity block of document dk
once document dk+l is reached. The following result can be established.
Lemma 14. Consider a (s, t ,e,p)-archive with the pointers chosen uniformly at random. If
l ∈O(k), then
E [Nl ]∼ ln
(
1+ l
k
)t
. (2.24)
Proof. The probability that at least one block of document dk+m points to one of the parity
blocks of dk for m > 0 is
1−
(
m+k−2
m+k−1
)t
, (2.25)
thus
E [Nl ]=
l∑
m=1
(
1−
(
m+k−2
m+k−1
)t)
= l −
l∑
m=1
(
m+k−2
m+k−1
)t
= l −
l∑
m=1
t∑
j=0
(
t
j
)
· (−1)
j
(m+k−1) j
= l −
l∑
m=1
(
1− t
m+k−1 +o(k
−1)
)
.
(2.26)
Since by assumption l ∈O(k), it follows that
E [Nl ]= l − l + t
l∑
m=1
1
m+k−1 +o(k)
= t (Hl+k−1−Hk )
(2.27)
where Hn is the n-th partial sum of the harmonic series, which can be bounded by Hn =
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lnn+o(n) [GKP94]. We can therefore conclude that
E [Nl ]= t (ln(l +k−1)− ln(k))+o(k)
∼ t ln
(
1+ l
k
)
.
(2.28)
Corollary 15. Let i be a positive integer. The expected number of documents in the archive
required before the parity blocks of document dk are pointed to i times is
Di ∼ k ·
(
e
1
t
)i
. (2.29)
Proof. Using Nl = i in Lemma 14 leads to
l ∼ k(e it −1), (2.30)
thus
Di = k+ l
∼ k+k(e it −1)
= k
(
e
1
t
)i
.
(2.31)
To illustrate the previous lemmas, consider a (1,4,2,3)-archive with 10 million documents. At
that point, when a new document is archived, from Lemma 12 we can expect that its parity
blocks will be pointed to for the ﬁrst time when the archive reaches 15 million documents, and
for the second time when it reaches 22.5 million documents. From Lemma 14, the expected
number of archived documents required until there is one pointer to its parity blocks is 13.96
million, and 19.48 million documents until there are two pointers to its parity blocks. The
difference from the results of Lemmas 12 and 14 is due to the skewness of the probability
distribution. From Lemma 13, the expected number of archived documents required before
a chosen parity block of that ﬁle is pointed to the ﬁrst time is 40 million. As the archive gets
bigger, it takes an increasingly long time before a document is pointed to, and during that time
it can be tampered without propagation to any other document in the archive.
The increasing intervals before documents get pointed to suggest a strategy for an attacker
who wants to destroy a document: the leaping attack. When executing the leaping attack,
the attacker moves away from dk towards the most recent documents in chronological order,
making increasingly larger leaps until it reaches documents that have not been pointed to yet.
Using the results presented so far in this section, we prove that when the number of pointers
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per codeword is small enough, the leaping attack can erase a ﬁle permanently by deleting a
sublinear number of other ﬁles in the archive.
Theorem 16. Suppose that an attacker wants to erase document dk from a (s, t ,e,p)-archive
with uniformly random pointers, and that the number of documents archived after dk is K  k.
If the number of pointers per document is chosen such that t < 1lnr , where r is the largest real
root of the polynomial xp+1−xp −xe +1− 1p , then E [Imin(dk )] ∈ o(K ).
Proof. We split the leaping attack into levels 1,2,3, ... and count, for level n, the number of
documents that need to be corrupted between documents dkn−1 and dkn , where
kn = k
(
e
1
t
)n
. (2.32)
We choose this speciﬁc kn because from Lemma 14 and Corollary 15, we can expect that one of
the parity blocks from a document in level l will be pointed to once in each subsequent level.
Since the number of documents at each level increases by a factor of e
1
t , the essence of the
proof is that the maximum number of documents that need to be corrupted by an attacker at
each level grows at a slower rate than e
1
t if the number of pointers per document is too small.
Let d be an intermediate document to be erased at level n of the leaping attack. This means
that at least one of the pointer blocks of d was already erased when an older document was
erased earlier in the attack. Thus, at most e additional block must be further erased from d . It
is expected that one document per level greater than n will point to a parity block of d , but
since the attacker can choose to erase any e of the p parity blocks, it can skip the ﬁrst p− e
times that a block of d is pointed to, and will propagate the attack to e documents, one in each
level from n+p−e+1 to n+p. Once a block is erased, the probability that it is pointed to by a
document at each subsequent level is 1p . Let xn be the expected number of documents that
need to be erased at level n. From the previous discussion, xn can be upper bounded by the
recurrence relation
xn = xn−p+e−1+·· ·+xn−p + 1
p
n−p−1∑
i=1
xi . (2.33)
To solve this recurrence relation, we can write
xn−1 = xn−p+e−2+·· ·+xn−p−1+ 1
p
n−p−2∑
i=1
xi , (2.34)
and by subtracting (2.34) from (2.33) it follows that
xn −xn−1 = xn−p+e−1+ 1
p
xn−p−1−xn−p−1
xn = xn−1+xn−p+e−1+
(
1
p
−1
)
xn−p−1.
(2.35)
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The solution of the recurrence relation is
xn =C1r n1 +C2r n2 +·· ·+Cp+1r np+1 (2.36)
where theCi are constants and the ri are the roots of the characteristic polynomial9
f (x)= xp+1−xp −xe +1− 1
p
. (2.37)
The rate of growth of xn when n is large is
lim
n→∞
xn+1
xn
=
C1r n+11 +C2r n+12 +·· ·+Cp+1r n+1p+1
C1r n1 +C2r n2 +·· ·+Cp+1r np+1
= r
(2.38)
where r is the largest real root of f (x).
If r < e 1t , equivalently if t < 1lnr , it follows that the number of documents at each level increases
faster than the number of documents that need to be tampered with at each level during the
leaping attack, thus E [Imin(dk )] ∈ o(K ).
It should be mentioned that the recurrence relation (2.33) is not optimal for three reasons.
Firstly, it assumes that there are no collisions, i.e., that all the documents at level n are different.
Pointers that collide are advantageous for the attacker because the involved documents can
be destroyed by deleting less than e blocks from them (they have more than one erased
tangled pointer block). Secondly, it assumes that an attacker always targets parity blocks
when completing the deletion of a ﬁle. If the attacker is lucky, it is possible that a pointer
block can be erased because all the older documents that use it have already been erased.
Thirdly, it assumes that the ﬁrst few pointers to d point to different parity blocks. This becomes
increasingly improbable as p increases and e remains ﬁxed, i.e., if we increase the rate of
the code. If the ﬁrst few pointers to parity blocks of d point to the same block b, then the
attacker will not erase it and will be able to propagate the attack further toward the most recent
archived documents by targeting the other parity blocks of d . To illustrate this, we improve on
Theorem 16 by calculating the expected time required until the most advantageous blocks for
the attacker are pointed to for archives with s = 1.
Lemma 17. Suppose that an attacker wants to erase document dk from a (1, t ,1,p)-archive with
random pointers and that the number of documents archived after dk is K  k. If the number of
pointers per document is chosen such that t < 1lnr , where r =
1+
√
5− 4p
2 , then E [Imin(dk )] ∈ o(K ).
Proof. Let M be the random variable deﬁned such that M =m, for m ≥ 1, means that the ﬁrst
m pointers to parity blocks of document d point to the same block, and the m+1-th pointer
9Without loss of generality, we assume that the roots have multiplicity one. The analysis that follows remains
valid if the roots are not all distinct.
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points to a different block. It should be clear that an attacker working on the leaping attack
will not choose the ﬁrst document pointed to and that
Pr[M =m]=
(
p−1
p
)m
. (2.39)
We use a reasoning similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 16. The recurrence relation for
M =m is given by
xn(m)= xn−m−1+ 1
p
n−m−2∑
i=1
xi . (2.40)
The asymptotic recurrence relation for the leaping attack is therefore
xn =
∞∑
m=1
Pr[M =m] · xn(m)
= p−1
p
n−2∑
n=1
xi .
(2.41)
To solve this recurrence relation, we can write
xn−1 = p−1
p
n−3∑
n=1
xi (2.42)
and by subtracting (2.42) from (2.41) it follows that
xn = xn−1+ p−1
p
xn−2. (2.43)
The solution of the recurrence relation is
xn = c1
⎛
⎜⎝1+
√
5− 4p
2
⎞
⎟⎠
n
+c2
⎛
⎜⎝1−
√
5− 4p
2
⎞
⎟⎠
n
(2.44)
and rate of growth of xn when n is large is
r  lim
n→∞
xn+1
xn
=
1+
√
5− 4p
2
. (2.45)
Hence, if t < 1lnr , then the number of documents at each level increases faster than the number
of documents that need to be tampered with at each level during the leaping attack and we
can conclude that E [Imin(dk )] ∈ o(K ).
Table 2.1 contains the lower bound for the number of pointers from Theorem 16 and Lemma 17
for different code rates sp . The only difference is for
s
p = 12 , for which Theorem 16 gives tmin ≥ 3
and Lemma 17 gives tmin ≥ 4. To compare the theoretical bounds, we simulated the damage
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p
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
s
1 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
2 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3
3 6 5 4 4 4 4 4
4 7 6 5 5 5 4
5 8 7 6 6 5
6 9 8 7 6
7 11 9 8
8 12 10
9 13
Table 2.1 – Lower bound for the number of pointers from Theorem 16 and Lemma 17 for
different code rates sp .
caused by the leaping attack on (1, t ,2,3)-archives with 106 documents and t ∈ {1,2,3,4,5,10}
pointers per document chosen uniformly at random. The results are shown in Figure 2.12. On
each graph, the curves represent target documents {d1,d5,d10,d50,d100,d500,d1000}, averaged
over 100 simulations. The phase transition as the number of pointers increases is obvious
from the graphs. When reaching the threshold, the asymptotic cost of the leaping attack no
longer depends on the target document: an attacker who wants to irrecoverably destroy a
document must destroy a constant fraction of all documents archived after it. For sp = 13 , the
bound given by Theorem 16 and Lemma 17 is t = 3, which appears tight when observing
Figure 2.12. Increasing t further accelerates the convergence and increases the fraction of
documents that must be destroyed.
2.8.1 Optimal attack and random entanglement
We conjecture, with entanglement chosen uniformly at random, that there is a constant
number of pointers threshold after which even the optimal attack will require the erasure of a
constant fraction of all documents archived after an old enough target. Since simulating the
optimal attack is computationally intractable and we do not have good enough theoretical
lower bounds, to support this conjecture we simulate the bounded breadth-ﬁrst search attack
described in Section 2.6.3. By bounding the size of the buffer, we can control the number of
nodes traversed at each level of the solution tree.
We use the bounded breadth-ﬁrst search algorithm with two heuristics: the minimum (Sec-
tion 15) and tailored (Section 2) heuristics. The tailored heuristic is based on Lemma 14: when
we decide whether or not to include a new document in the attacked set, we estimate the
beginning of its propagation to other documents with Lemma 14 times the number of blocks
to erase in the document. This is more accurate than selecting the document that propagates
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(a) t = 1 pointer.
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(b) t = 2 pointers.
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(c) t = 3 pointers.
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(d) t = 4 pointers.
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(e) t = 5 pointers.
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(f) t = 10 pointers.
Figure 2.12 – Damage caused by the leaping attack on (1, t ,2,3)-archives of size 106 with
pointers chosen uniformly at random and t ∈ {1,2,3,4,5,10}. On each graph, the curves
represent target document {d1,d5,d10,d50,d100,d500,d1000}, respectively. Each curve is the
average over 100 simulations.
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to the smallest number of documents (minimum heuristic), or selecting the document leaping
as far as possible towards the end of the archive (leaping heuristic).
Figure 2.13 shows the damage caused by the tailored bounded breadth-ﬁrst search attack on
(1,5,2,3)-archives of size 104 with pointers chosen uniformly at random and target document
di for i ∈ {1,5,10,50,100}. Each curve represents a different tree width (buffer size). The
leaping attack is also shown for comparison. Each curve is the average over 100 simulations.
Figure 2.14 shows the damage caused by the minimum bounded breadth-ﬁrst attack with
the same simulation parameters. The ﬁgures provide numerical evidence supporting our
conjecture and show the efﬁciency of the greedy leaping attack
2.9 Extensions and Discussion
In this section, we discuss in greater details the assumptions made and constraints self-
imposed in this chapter. We also extend and relax them in various ways, and examine the
consequences.
2.9.1 To store or not to store source blocks ?
In the presented architecture, we use codes in semi-systematic form and do store the source
blocks. This comes at a non-negligible performance cost: accessing a document requires
decoding of its corresponding codeword, and thus fetching the required threshold of valid
blocks. Even with a fast decoding algorithm, we still incur the bandwidth overhead of fetching
s+ t blocks to retrieve s effective blocks of data.
It is tempting to remove this overhead by including the source blocks in the systematic form
of the code, and allow the clients to directly fetch the source blocks. However, from the
censorship-resistance perspective, a systematic code would invalidate all our previous rea-
soning. We can no longer equate recoverability of a codeword and recoverability of the
corresponding document, as the source blocks may still be recoverable even though the code-
word is below the decoding threshold. In an extreme case, the adversary can censor all the
stored parity blocks, losing all the redundancy in the storage system, without degradation of
service. Targeted source blocks can then be destroyed at will, making their corresponding
codewords undecodable; all more recent codewords having pointers to these source blocks
immediately become undecodable if they weren’t already so, and the attack does not need
to propagate further. A system with stored and readily available source blocks can thus only
provide weak censorship-resistance, as this attack, even at a high material cost, does not affect
data availability.
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(c) Target document d10.
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(d) Target document d50.
Leaping attack
bbtailored, b - 1
bbtailored, b - 3
bbtailored, b - 10
bbtailored, b - 30
bbtailored, b - 100
10 100 1000 104
10-2
0.1
1
Archived documents in chronological order
D
es
tro
ye
d
do
cu
m
en
ts
(e) Target document d100.
Figure 2.13 – Damage caused by the tailored bounded breadth-ﬁrst search attack on (1,5,2,3)-
archives of size 104 with pointers chosen uniformly at random and target document di for
i ∈ {1,5,10,50,100}. Each curve represents a different tree width (buffer size). The leaping
attack is also shown for comparison. Each curve is the average over 100 simulations.
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(b) Target document d5.
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(c) Target document d10.
Leaping attack
bbl inob - r
bbl inob - d
bbl inob - r ,
bbl inob - d,
bbl inob - r , ,
r , r , , r , , , r , 4
r , -2
, 1r
r
30c. iAeh hvcul entmin c. 0vnvsvgicasv0he0
D
em
t0v
ye
h
hv
cu
l
en
tm
(d) Target document d50.
Figure 2.14 – Damage caused by the minimum bounded breadth-ﬁrst search attack on
(1,5,2,3)-archives of size 104 with pointers chosen uniformly at random and target docu-
ment di for i ∈ {1,5,10,50}. Each curve represents a different tree width (buffer size). The
leaping attack is also shown for comparison. Each curve is the average over 100 simulations.
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This material cost can further be reduced. An adversary could tweak his attack algorithm to
always spare the source blocks (except for the original target). This results in a system that
has lost redundancy for some documents but is still able to directly serve all non-censored
source blocks. Recall that for all documents but the initial target, the attacker needs to destroy
at most e blocks (the code requires e+1 errors to fail, but at least one block is already missing,
otherwise the document would not have entered the target set). We have e ≤ p − s (with
equality reached for MDS codes), so it is always possible to exclude the source blocks from the
attack, and choose among the p− s remaining blocks. This offers complexity tradeoff in terms
of computational effort versus number of blocks to make the attack irrecoverable.
One can wonder whether we can prevent this by hiding which of the p parity blocks are actual
source blocks. This could be achieved by storing the identity of the source block separately
from the rest of the metadata. Users with access to the public metadata could still repair the
system, without needing to know the identity of the source blocks. This is akin to the Repair
Capabilities mechanism of Tahoe [WOW08]. However, if clients use this fast path to access
documents, a passive adversary monitoring access to the system could very quickly deduce
which blocks are the source blocks. To counter this, clients could request all the blocks and
avoid decoding, but this does not appear a worthwhile tradeoff considering the bandwidth
overhead.
2.9.2 Hiding metadata
We assumed so far that the metadata, providing the associations between blocks and doc-
uments (and required for decoding) would be made public. Our attacks have relied on this
metadata being public, but so do our repair algorithms. One can wonder whether hiding the
metadata from the public results in a net gain or loss of censorship resistance for the users.
In our model, a block can be in only two states, directly recoverable (meaning the system is
able to provide an uncorrupted version of the block when queried for it), or lost. The block
could be considered lost for several reasons, including that the actual storage has been silently
corrupted, that the data is missing, or even that the data is intact and present, but that the
system has been coerced into ignoring requests for such a block. The latter scenario is relevant
in a censorship context, where it might be easier for a censor to impose a blacklist of forbidden
content than to endlessly hunt and remove blocks as they pop up on various systems.
Consider a system where the metadata is kept privately. In such a context, the adversary has
no a priori information about the relationships between blocks, but has been made aware of
the existence of a document to censor by revelation of the corresponding metadata. In such a
model, if enough blocks are lost to make a document irrecoverable, users must wait for a third
party to access an entangled document. The said third party must then notice that not all
blocks are healthy, and after decoding the document, proceed to reupload the missing blocks
at its own expense. Some techniques, like the mechanism of repair caps in Tahoe [WOW08],
can delegate repairs to incentivized third parties, however to do so they must be trustworthy
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enough to receive a copy of the secret metadata. Furthermore, a system with private metadata
is in position of censoring repair attempts simply by refusing to serve the forbidden blocks, no
matter how many third parties try to reupload them. By contrast, if the metadata is public,
users can perform their own repairs as long as the attack is not irrecoverable, and for this they
do not need an additional incentive. Reuploading the missing content is still at their own cost,
but the system has a direct incentive to accept it: every missing block costs the system up to
s+ t fetches of other blocks. In fact, it saves bandwidth for the system to perform the repair
itself.
2.9.3 Hiding timing information
The proposed basic attacks all heuristically rely on the attacker being able to infer a strict
ordering of documents in time. On the other hand, the reconstruction algorithm does not
need such information. This leads to two important questions: is it possible to hide this timing
information from an attacker, and is it useful?
Suppose the metadata has been stripped of any explicit timestamps. Can the attacker still
compute an ordering of the documents? With the exception of anchor blocks, every block in
the system must be included as a parity block in exactly one document, and may appear any
number of times as a pointer block in older documents. Furthermore, the former document
must be older than all the latter. This property is sufﬁcient to deﬁne a partial order on the
documents.
An adversary can use a topological sort algorithm to generate a compatible total order in
linear time [Tar76]. Because block relationships are the only thing that matter to our attack
algorithms, such a total order would be suitable to run the attack. Therefore, if we want to gain
something by hiding the document order, we have to ensure that the adversary cannot deduce
the role (stored or pointer) of blocks in a particular codeword.
2.9.4 Hiding block roles
So far, all our representations of the system used a code which had a ﬁxed mapping from
code slots to roles. We can randomize this mapping without loss of generality. In a typical
setting, our initial, systematic, (n,k) MDS code, the encoding process is used to generate code
words ck+1, . . . ,cn from the k source words c1, . . . ,ck , whereas the decoding process can ﬁnd a
unique solution for all the ci , from any k-subset of them. As such, encoding is a special case of
decoding (possibly with better performance, depending on the code).
Therefore, when generating a new document, it is not mandatory to have a ﬁxed mapping
between roles and slots. The client can randomly allocate the pointer blocks to slots, then
compute the missing entries. Then, the adversary can no longer locally distinguish between
pointers and parity blocks of a document.
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Unfortunately, even if the system stores the metadata in such a way that the block roles are
locally obscured, an attacker with a global view of the metadata can always recover such
roles with the following algorithm. The adversary can look for blocks that appear exactly
once in the whole system, and will know that such occurrences are necessarily parity blocks.
Because the set of documents is ﬁnite and not empty, and our block role property is transitive
(a requirement for a partial order), there must be at least one maximal document, for which
no parity blocks are ever pointed. For these maximal documents, the adversary will be able
to infer the role of all the parity blocks. If we assume that the amount of parity and pointer
blocks per document is a global constant, the attacker knows he has successfully identiﬁed all
the parity occurrences of these maximal documents. All other occurrences of blocks can be
identiﬁed as pointers. The attacker can then remove these maximal documents (which will sit
at the top of the total order), and repeat the process recursively while ignoring occurrences of
blocks in the removed documents. Eventually, the set of documents ends up empty with all
the occurrence roles known.
2.9.5 Metadata write access and recoding attack
We assumed that an attacker can read, but cannot alter the archive metadata. The underlying
assumption is that metadata are small enough to be mass replicated or stored locally by the
clients interested in a document; or, at the very least, that clients can store a cryptographically
secure ﬁngerprint of the relevant metadata. Recall that destroying all copies of the metadata
would make a document impossible to access, but that this is not worse than losing the keys
of the upper encryption layer.
Deﬁnition 18. Consider a (s, t ,e,p)-archive. An extended integrity set E(dk) is a set of doc-
uments containing dk such that it is possible to erase at least e + s +1 blocks per document
in E(dk) \ {dk }, at least e + 1 blocks in document dk, and no block in any document in the
complementary set E(dk ). We write Emin(dk ) to denote the size of the smallest extended integrity
set of document dk.
If an attacker can write metadata, it can, instead of destroying ﬁles, decode and recode
documents without destroying them, and rewrite metadata accordingly. When doing such a
recoding attack, the attacker ﬁrst decodes the document dk to censor, erases e+1 blocks from
the document codeword, censors the document by replacing its content with something else,
and recodes the censored document back in the archive. Changing the target codeword will
also affect documents pointing to its erased blocks, thus the attacker must recursively recode
the documents pointing to the censored document and erase enough blocks in the original
codewords. The difference between integrity sets and extended integrity sets is that the source
blocks of a recoded document dk are recoverable, thus to make the original codeword of dk
irrecoverable, the attacker must erase at least e+ s+1= p+1 of its blocks instead of e+1.
Theorem 19. The size |S| of the smallest irrecoverable recoding attack of a target document dk
is equal to Emin(dk ).
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Proof. We ﬁrst prove that |S| ≤ Emin(dk). From the smallest extended integrity set Emin(dk),
an attacker can decode all the documents in it, erase all the blocks required to realize the
extended integrity set, recode a censored version of dk , and recode all the other documents
di ∈ Emin(dk ) \ {dk }. The original codewords of documents di ∈ Emin(dk ) \ {dk } are missing at
least e+ s+1 blocks, thus even by decoding the new codewords and recovering the source
blocks, the old codewords will miss at least e+1 blocks, thus none of them is recoverable. This
recoding attack requires Emin(dk ) recodings, thus |S| ≤ Emin(dk ).
We now show that |S| ≥ Emin(dk ). Let S be the smallest recoding attack. The original codeword
of dk has at least e + 1 erased blocks, otherwise dk could be recovered. Next, consider a
document di ∈ S such that di = dk . We argue that the original codeword of dk before recoding
has at least e + s +1 erased blocks. Suppose that it is false. Using the source blocks of the
recoded documents, we run the reconstruction algorithm and recover a nonempty setO of
original codewords including the original codeword of di . IfC includes the original codeword
of dk , then dk can be recoded, which is a contradiction, whereas if C does not include it, it
follows that all the codewords inC did not have to be recoded, which contradicts the fact that
S is the smallest recoding attack. Hence, S is an extended integrity set and Emin(dk )≤ |S|.
The size difference between the optimal recoding attack and the optimal attack can be ar-
bitrarily large. Consider a (1,1,2,3)-archive where the pointer block from document di is
entangled with one of the parity blocks of di−1 for all i . We can easily show that Imin(dk )= 2
and Emin(dk)= N +1 where N > 0 is the number of documents archived after dk . Thus, an
attacker can tamper with dk irrecoverably by also erasing dk+1, but if it does not want to
destroy other documents, even with complete control over the data and metadata, it must
recode the N documents archived after dk .
2.9.6 STEP-archival versus WORM storage
There have been proposals for immutable storage systems with hardware enforcement. In such
a system, the storage controller (or the medium itself) will refuse or fail to honor write requests
that would overwrite existing data. It is assumed that a hostile party (a rogue administrator, or
an outside attacker) may be able to compromise the operating system, but not the ﬁrmware of
the storage controller (or the laws of physics, in the case of write-once media.).
These techniques are applicable to fundamentally different scenario than the ones we are
considering. The storage controller can only guarantee that, as long as the storage device
is operating properly, all data ever written is available for reading by the main system. A
malicious administrator could still practice censorship by having the main system refuse to
perform read requests for censored data. In such a system, it would still be possible to restore
access to the censored data by taking back control of the main system.
When facing censorship from a legal authority, however, it may not be possible to legally “take
back control” and restore the original intended system behavior. Again, with our approach, it
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does not matter if censorship is implemented by physically destroying blocks or by making
them unavailable for reading through other means. As long as decoding and metadata man-
agement is performed on the client, the storage system would need to either guess the intent
of the client, and selectively prevent access (and only achieve probabilistic censorship), or
prevent access without regard for the decoding intent (and cause collateral damage).
2.9.7 Space reclaiming
A very serious restriction of our model is the apparent inability to delete past ﬁles. Imple-
menting a deletion mechanism is not trivial, as it should prevent attackers from using it to
perform censorship. In the setting of immutable storage, data has no canonical owner, and it
is not always possible to distinguish a “legitimate owner” from an attacker, assuming a reliable
deﬁnition of legitimate owner is even possible.
With random entanglement, protection increases over time. Such a system cannot reclaim
space from old unwanted ﬁles, and is entirely dependant on the storage system being able
to grow as fast as its users require, while retaining everything forever. Clearly, this is not
sustainable.
In the case of proximity entanglement, as we have shown, it is possible to destroy the tail of the
archive without losing current data. To solve the problem of space reclaiming, an intermediary
solution would involve a STEP-archive rolling in time, with parity blocks being garbage-
collected in order at a predictible time. This system would require clients to periodically
refresh their data, by recreating new versions (with different metadata) of their ﬁles at ﬁxed
intervals. Obsolete ﬁles would naturally disappear after a while, if no user took responsibility
for refreshing them. Randomized convergent encryption would be required to prevent a
censor for recognizing the new blocks immediately, and blocking their insertion into the
system.
2.10 Conclusion and Open Problems
In this chapter, we introduced and studied STEP-archives with the objective of providing
strong tampering and censorship resistance for long-term data storage and permanent archiv-
ing in a practically implementable manner. Our long-term goals are a proof of concept and
a large-scale implementation, and to do so there are theoretical and practical questions to
explore.
2.10.1 Variable block size
Imposing a ﬁxed block size at the system level is rigid and inefﬁcient. An unnecessary large
block size wastes storage space, decoding time and bandwidth, but a too small block size
bloats metadata and increases the number of IO operations. Because we need to be able to
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choose pointers to other blocks, allowing arbitrary block sizes would considerably complicate
the pointer selection process. A reasonable compromise is to allow a limited selection of
regular block sizes, for instance powers of a power of 2. Furthermore, one could split bigger
blocks or concatenate smaller blocks when choosing pointers. This, however, considerably
complicates the analysis of the system behaviour under attack as one must also consider
partially erased blocks. It also potentially introduces additional overhead, since not all storage
APIs allow to fetch partial blocks.
2.10.2 Data expiration
We currently have no procedure to delete obsolete data and reclaim storage space. While
the impossibility to delete old data is paramount to obtain strong censorship resistance, and
while storage technologies have shown exponential improvements ever since the advent of
computing, we still wish to explore ways to relax this constraint. One might try to extend our
framework to only allow the owner to delete data, but this is problematic in many ways. First,
in a deduplicated system, there might be more than one rightful owner. Allowing a single
owner to trigger the deletion would effectively let him censor the other owners. Therefore, we
would need a consensus mechanism to ensure all owners effectively wish to delete. Second,
allowing the owner(s) to drive deletion would make them designated targets for a determined
censor. We can avoid that simply by not giving the owner, or original creator, any special
privileges regarding preservation of data.
Still, it might be desirable for a system to be able to reclaim storage from old, stale data.
Unbounded pointer distributions, like the uniform distribution we used in section 2.8, do not
allow this. But in principle, if bounded distributions like the sliding windows used in section
2.7 are used, it would be possible for a system to remove old data progressively, providing a
bound on the age of data recoverable by the clients.
In such a system, uploaded content would have an expiration date, and clients would be
responsible for periodically re-inserting the data they do not want to see disappear when
they expire. Because this re-insertion step would require coding against a different set of
blocks, clients would no longer be able to rely on the metadata hash to authenticate a ﬁle10.
The system would require a more sophisticated mechanism for the users to authenticate
the new versions of the metadata blocks. Two possible approaches for this could be either
some kind of reputation system vetting on the authenticity of the new metadata, or a proof of
storage [ZX12, JKJ07] mechanism allowing a client to interactively query the storage system,
to ensure with high probability the legitimacy of a new metadata block.
10Even if a client had the hashes of the relevant source blocks, he would be forced to pay the t bandwidth cost
and proceed with the decoding before being able to check it.
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2.10.3 Entanglement and coding
The main theoretical open problem is to derive non-trivial lower bounds on the cost of the
optimal irrecoverable attack. Intuitively, the leaping attack is a good approach against uniform
random entanglement, and we conjecture that the optimal attack will not fare better when the
number of pointers passes a threshold since no amount of backtracking will compensate for
the exponential propagation of the dependencies in the archive.
Another challenge to overcome is to provide quick tamper resistance after archiving new
data while providing strong censorship-resistance in the long term. Essentially, we want the
beneﬁts of regular entanglement in a sliding window and the beneﬁts of uniformly random
entanglement. Solutions in this direction will probably involve a mix of partly structured
pointers to the recent past and pointers arbitrarily far in the past. Another pathworth exploring
is to use STEP-archival in parallel with regular replication for new documents and to get rid of
the replicas as they age.
Finally, while we focused on MDS codes in this chapter, the model can be used with any
code allowing encoding of the entangled blocks in systematic form, we want to study how to
provide strong censorship-resistance using modern and efﬁcient erasure codes for distributed
storage. Furthermore, considering that the bandwidth overhead is proportional to the number
of entangled blocks per document, we are especially interested in adapting locally repairable
codes to deal with hardware failures.
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3 Public Keys
3.1 Introduction
We performed a sanity check of public keys collected on the web and found that the vast
majority works as intended. Our main goal was to test the validity of the assumption that
different random choices are made each time keys are generated. We found that this is not
always the case, resulting in public keys that offer no security. Our conclusion is that generating
secure public keys in the real world is challenging. We did not study usage of public keys.
Various studies have been conducted to assess the state of the current public key infrastructure,
with a focus on X.509 certiﬁcates (cf. [CSF+08]). Key generation standards for RSA (cf. [RSA78])
have been analysed and found to be satisfactory in [LN11]. In [HBKC11] and [VFBH11] (and
the references therein) several problems have been identiﬁed that are mostly related to the
way certiﬁcates are used. In this chapter we complement previous studies by concentrating
on computational and randomness properties of actual public keys, issues that are usually
taken for granted.
Compared to the collection of certiﬁcates considered in [HBKC11], where shared public keys
are “not very frequent”, we found a much higher fraction of duplicates. We also found public
keys that are not related to the Debian OpenSSL vulnerability but that offer no security at all.
The existence of such keys may be crypto-folklore, but it was new to us (but see [Joh99]). This
is not a disappearing trend, as may be seen by comparing the results in this chapter to those
reported in [LHA+12b]. Vulnerabilities of this sort could affect the expectation of security that
the public key infrastructure is intended to achieve. We limited our study to collections of
public keys and did not consider issues arising while using them.
We summarize our ﬁndings, referring to later sections for details. We collected as many openly
accessible public keys as possible from the web, while avoiding activities that our system
administrators may have frowned upon. In particular we did not capture or analyse any
encrypted trafﬁc of digitally signed documents. The set of 11.7 million public keys that we col-
lected contains 6.4 million distinct RSA moduli. The remainder is almost evenly split between
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ElGamal keys (cf. [ElG85]) and DSA keys (cf. [U.S09]), plus a single ECDSA key (cf. [U.S09]).
The frequency of keys blacklisted due to the Debian OpenSSL vulnerability (cf. [YRS+09])
is comparable to [HBKC11]; the ﬁndings presented below are not related to this vulnerabil-
ity. All keys were checked for consistency such as compositeness, primality, and (sub)group
membership tests. As the sheer number of keys and their provenance precluded extensive
cryptanalysis and the sensibility thereof, per key a modest search for obvious weaknesses was
carried out as well. These efforts resulted in a small number of inconsistent or weak keys.
A tacit and crucial assumption underlying the security of the public key infrastructure is that
during key setup previous random choices are not repeated. In [HBKC11, LN11] public key
properties are considered but this issue is not addressed, with [LN11] nevertheless concluding
that
The entropy of the output distribution [of standardized RSA key generation] is
always almost maximal, ... and the outputs are hard to factor if factoring in general
is hard.
We do not question the validity of this conclusion, but found that it can only be valid if each
output is considered in isolation. When combining outputs the above assumption sometimes
fails. Among all types of public keys collected (except ECDSA), we found duplicates with
unrelated owners. This is a concern because, if these owners ﬁnd out, they may breach
each other’s security. Duplication of keys is more frequent in our collection than in the one
from [HBKC11].
We also stumbled upon RSA moduli, not affected by the Debian OpenSSL vulnerability, that
offer no security. Their secret keys are accessible to anyone who redoes our work. Assuming
access to the public key collection, this is straightforward compared to more traditional ways
to retrieve RSA secret keys (cf. [Cop93, LL93]).
Figure 3.1 depicts a simpliﬁed sketch of the situation and how it may evolve.
An existing collection of seven (black) keys is extended with six (red) new keys, where capital
letters play the role of (matching) large primes. Initially, keys AB, CD, EF, GH, and JK on the left
are secure and keys LM and LN on the right are openly insecure in the same keyring due to
the common factor L. New key PQ is secure and appended to the secure list on the left. New
key AB duplicates key AB on the left, making both insecure to each other but not to anyone
else. New key LM duplicates a key already known to be in the openly insecure group, while
key LR results in a new openly insecure modulus on that keyring. Key ES removes known
good key EF from the secure keys on the left, resulting in a new openly insecure group on the
right consisting of keys EF and ES. Even if the owner of ES now knows that he is insecure and
destroys the key, this information can be used by any owners involved to determine the factors
of key EF. Key GJ removes two known good keys, GH and JK, from the list of secure keys on the
left to form an insecure double keyring on the right (cf. Figure 3.5 in Section 3.3). All example
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Moduli that share no or both prime factors Moduli that share one prime factor
PQ AB LM LR ES GJ
PQ
LN
EF
GH
JK
CD
E
SEF
G
J
G
H JK
ABAB
LMLM
LM
LR
ron was wrong, whit is right
Figure 3.1 – Illustration of attack scenarios
keyrings, and many more, occur in the real world. Note that a key that has been dragged from
left to right will never be able to return.
Our ﬁndings, of which we do not and will not publicly present any evidence, are conﬁrmed
by independent similar work (cf. [Hen12]). As shown in Section 3.3 we used a computational
method different from the one used in [Hen12].
Section 3.2 presents our data collection efforts. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 describe the counts and
calculations performed for the RSA-related data and for the ElGamal, DSA, and ECDSA data,
respectively. Section 3.5 summarizes our ﬁndings.
3.2 Data collection
Before the data from [Ele10] was generally available, we started collecting public keys from a
wide variety of sources, assisted by colleagues and students. We collected only public keys, no
encrypted data or digitally signed documents (other than digital certiﬁcates). This resulted
in almost 5.5 million PGP keys and fewer than 0.1 million X.509 certiﬁcates. The latter got a
boost with [Ele10] and, to a smaller extent, the data from [HBKC11]. We did not engage in web
crawling, extensive ssh-session monitoring, or other data collection activities that may be
perceived as intrusive, aggressive, or unethical. Thus, far more data can be collected than we
did (see also [LHA+12b]).
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Skipping a description of our attempts to agree on a sufﬁciently uniform and accessible
representation of the data, by November 2011 the counts had settled as follows: 6 185372
distinct X.509 certiﬁcates (most from the EFF SSL repository, 43 from other sources), and
5481332 PGP keys, for a total of at most 11 666704 public keys. Of the X.509 certiﬁcates
6 185230 are labeled to contain an RSA (modulus, exponent) pair with 141 DSA public keys
and a single ECDSA point on the NIST standardized curve secp384r1 (cf. [Cer00, Section
2.8], [U.S09]). Of the certiﬁcates 47.6% have an expiration date later than 2011. About 77.7%
of the certifying signatures use SHA1 or better (5287×SHA256, 24×SHA384, 525×SHA512),
22.3% use MD5 (with 122×MD2, 30×GOST, 14×MD4, and 9×RIPEMD160). Both requirements,
expiration later than 2011 and usage of SHA1-or-2, are met by 33.4% of the certiﬁcates.
Of the PGP keys 2 546 752 (46.5%) are labeled as ElGamal public keys, 2 536 959 (46.3%) as DSA
public keys, the other 397 621 (7.3%) as RSA public keys. PGP keys have no expiration dates or
hashes. All public keys were further analysed as described below.
3.3 RSA
In this section we present the results of various counts and tests that we conducted on the data
labeled as RSA public keys. An RSA public key is a pair (n,e) of a supposedly hard to factor
RSA modulus n and a public exponent e. The corresponding secret key is the integer d such
that de ≡ 1 mod ϕ(n) or, equivalently, the factorization of n.
Public exponents. Table 3.1 lists the ten most frequent public exponents along with their
percentage of occurrence for the RSA keys in the X.509 certiﬁcates, the PGP keys, and when
combined. Except for eight times e = 1 and two even e-values among the PGP RSA keys, there
is no reason to suspect that the e-values are not functional. Two e-values were found that, due
to their size and random appearance, may correspond to a short secret exponent (we have not
investigated this). The public exponents are not further regarded below.
Debian moduli. Two of the n-values, a 1024 and a 2048-bit one each occurring once, were
discarded because they could be fully factored using the data from [Moo08] (cf. Debian
OpenSSL vulnerability in [YRS+09]). A further 30097 n-values (0.48%, with 21459 distinct ones)
were found to be blacklisted (cf. [T+]), but as their factors were not easily available they were
kept.
Shared moduli. We partition the set of 6 185 228 X.509 certiﬁcates into clusters, where certiﬁ-
cates in the same cluster contain the same RSA modulus. There is a considerable number of
clusters containing two or more certiﬁcates, each of which could be a security issue; clusters
consisting of one certiﬁcate, on the other hand, are the good cases. As depicted in Figure 3.2,
there is one cluster with 16489 certiﬁcates (the blue circle on the x-axis), followed by clusters
of sizes 8366, 6351, 5055, 3586, 3538, 2645, for a total of 14 clusters with more than a thou-
sand certiﬁcates (the red and blue circles on the x-axis; the 5055 share a blacklisted modulus,
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Table 3.1 – Most frequently occurring RSA public exponents.
X.509 PGP Combined
e % e % e %
65537 98.4921 65537 48.8501 65537 95.4933
17 0.7633 17 39.5027 17 3.1035
3 0.3772 41 7.5727 41 0.4574
35 0.1410 19 2.4774 3 0.3578
5 0.1176 257 0.3872 19 0.1506
7 0.0631 23 0.2212 35 0.1339
11 0.0220 11 0.1755 5 0.1111
47 0.0101 3 0.0565 7 0.0596
13 0.0042 21 0.0512 11 0.0313
65535 0.0011 2127+3 0.0248 257 0.0241
other 0.0083 other 0.6807 other 0.0774
with no other blacklisted modulus occurring more than seven times). On the other side of
the scale the number of good cases is 5 918499 (the single green circle on the y-axis), with
58913 and 7108 clusters consisting of two and three certiﬁcates, respectively. It follows that
6185228−5918499= 266729 X.509 certiﬁcates (4.3%) contain an RSA modulus that is shared
with another X.509 certiﬁcate. With 71024 clusters containing two or more certiﬁcates it
follows that there are 5918499+71024= 5989523 different n-values.
Looking at the owners with sharedn-values among the relevant set of 266 729 X.509 certiﬁcates,
many of the duplications are re-certiﬁcations or other types of unsuspicious recycling of the
same key material by its supposedly legal owner. It also becomes clear that any single owner
may come in many different guises. On the other hand, there are also many instances where
an n-value is shared among seemingly unrelated owners. Distinguishing intentionally shared
keys from other duplications (which are prone to fraud) is not straightforward, and is not
facilitated by the volume of data we are dealing with (as 266 729 cases have to be considered).
We leave it as a subject for further investigation into this “fuzzy” recognition problem to come
up with good insights, useful information, and reliable counts.
The 397621 PGP RSA keys share their moduli to a much smaller extent: one n-value occurs
ﬁve times and 27 occur twice. Overall, 28 n-values occur more than once, for a total of 59
occurrences. The n-value that occurs in ﬁve PGP keys also occurs twice among the X.509
certiﬁcates, and all seven occurrences refer to the same owner. For some of the other 27
multiple occurrences of n-values unique ownership of the RSA keys was harder to assess.
Distinct moduli. As seen above, we extracted 5989523 different n-values from the X.509
certiﬁcates. Similarly, 397621−59+28= 397590 of the PGP n-values are unique. Joining the
two sets resulted in 6386984 distinct values, with the 129 n-values contained in both sets
occurring in 204 X.509 certiﬁcates and in 137 PGP keys: as mentioned, some PGP keys are
X.509-certiﬁed as well (though we have not tried to establish unique or conﬂicting ownerships,
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Figure 3.2 – Number of certiﬁcate clusters as a function of the cluster-size.
as this already proved to be infeasible for keys shared just among X.509 certiﬁcates). In order
not to make it easier to re-derive our results, most information below refers to the joined set of
unique values, not distinguishing between X.509 and PGP ones.
Modulus sizes. The cumulative sizes of the moduli in the set of 6 386 984 n-values are depicted
in Figure 3.3. Although 512-bit and 768-bit RSA moduli were factored in 1999 (cf. [CDL+00])
and 2009 (cf. [KAF+10]), respectively, 1.6% of the n-values have 512 bits (with 0.01% of size 384
and smallest size 374 occurring once) and 0.8% of size 768. Those moduli are weak, but still
offer marginal security. A large number of the 512-bit ones were certiﬁed after the year 2000
and even until a few years ago. With 73.9% the most common size is 1024 bits, followed by 2048
bits with 21.7%. Sizes 3072, 4096, and 8192 contribute 0.04%, 1.5%, and 0.01%, respectively.
The largest size is 16384 bits, of which there are 181 (0.003%).
Primality, small factors, and other tests. Two of the unique n-values are prime, 171 have a
factor < 224 (with 68 even n-values) after removal of which six cofactors are prime. About 25%
of the remaining 165 composites were fully factored after a modest search for small factors
using the implementation from [Zim12] of the elliptic curve method (ECM, cf. [Len87]), some
of the others may indeed be hard to factor and could, in principle, serve as RSA modulus.
Nevertheless, these 173 n-values do not comply with the standards for the generation of
RSA moduli (cf. [LN11]) and they were discarded. Nine cases are probably due to copy-and-
paste errors, as eight proper moduli were found that differed from the wrong ones in a few
hexadecimal positions (two distinct wrong moduli match up with the same correct one).
Fermat’s factorization method, which works well if two factors are close together, did not
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Figure 3.3 – Cumulative number of modulus sizes for RSA.
produce any factors. In particular we found no moduli as reported by Mike Wiener [Wie92]
(n = pq with p prime and q the least prime greater than p, and thus with p the largest prime
≤ [n]). Neither were there any non-trivial powers.
Moduli with shared factors. Moduli that share one prime factor result in complete loss of
security for all moduli involved. We discuss the results based on the graphs spawned by
the moduli and shared factors. If different users make different choices during key setup,
the graph associated to c distinct n-values (cf. Introduction) would consist of c connected
components1, each consisting of a single edge connecting two unidentiﬁed – and supposedly
unidentiﬁable – primes. This turned out not to be the case: it took a matter of hours on a single
core to ﬁnd 1995 connected components that each consist of at least two edges. Much larger
datasets can be handled without trouble. Our calculation uses a simple-minded binary tree,
forming a parent node lcm(a,b) for leaves a, b while taking appropriate action if gcd(a,b)> 1
and using the subquadratic multiplication and greatest common divisor implementations
from [Fre11]. It scales well and is marginally slower than the more contrived gcd-calculation
described in [Hen12] but uses less memory. On a 1.8GHz i7 processor the straightforward
approach would require about ten core-years and would not scale well. Inclusion of the p
and q-values from Section 3.4 and the primes from [Moo08] related to the Debian OpenSSL
vulnerability [YRS+09] did not produce additional results.
Of the 1995 connected components, 1988 are depth one trees2. Of those 1200 have two leaves
(i.e., 1200 pairs of n-values, each with a distinct prime factor in common), 345 three leaves,
etc., up to a single one with 4627 leaves (i.e., 4627 n-values all with the same prime factor in
common). It is not uncommon for an n-value corresponding to an edge of these depth one
1Two distinct vertices are in the same connected component if and only if they are connected by a path
consisting of edges in the graph.
2A depth one tree has no cycles and contains one root vertex with edges leading to all other vertices, as in
Figure 3.4.
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Table 3.2 – The s-column indicates the number of depth one trees with  leaves for which all
edge multiplicities are equal to one, the m-column the number of trees for which at least one
edge occurs at least twice, and T = s+m the total. The bold entry corresponds to the depth
one tree depicted in Figure 3.4.
 s m T  s m T  s m T  s m T
2 1009 191 1200 13 3 3 6 24 1 1 2 59 0 1 1
3 259 86 345 14 2 3 5 26 0 1 1 61 0 1 1
4 95 44 139 15 1 4 5 27 0 1 1 63 1 2 3
5 43 32 75 16 2 1 3 32 0 1 1 65 0 1 1
6 23 29 52 17 1 2 3 33 0 1 1 92 0 1 1
7 20 19 39 18 1 1 2 35 0 2 2 121 0 1 1
8 13 17 30 19 1 2 3 36 1 1 2 151 0 1 1
9 4 11 15 20 1 2 3 37 0 1 1 348 0 1 1
10 3 8 11 21 0 3 3 42 0 1 1 379 0 1 1
11 3 9 12 22 1 2 3 44 0 2 2 4627 0 1 1
12 3 3 6 23 0 1 1 46 0 1 1
trees to occur more than once as an RSA modulus: 497 of the 1988 depth one trees have at least
one edge that corresponds to an RSA modulus that occurs in at least two X.509 certiﬁcates
or PGP keys. In the other 1491 depth one trees all edge multiplicities are one. Table 3.2 lists
for each number of leaves  how often each type occurs, with the s-column the number of
trees for which all n-values occur once as RSA modulus in an X.509 certiﬁcate or PGP key, the
m-column the number of trees for which at least one n-value occurs as RSA modulus in at
least two X.509 certiﬁcates or PGP keys, and the total T = s+m. For smaller tree-sizes s is
larger, for larger trees multiple occurrence of moduli is more common.
Six of the other seven connected components contain four vertices and three edges, but are
not depth one trees. Each of these six components thus consists of a “central” n-value that
has a factor in common with each of two other, co-prime n-values. The remaining connected
component is the most intriguing – or suspicious – as it is a complete graph on nine vertices
(K9): nine primes, each of whose
(9
2
)= 36 pairwise products occurs as n-value.
Denoting the primes identiﬁed with the vertices of the graph by p1, p2, . . . (using an ordering
naturally implied by our representation), Figures 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 depict the largest depth one
tree, the six four-vertex components, and the K9, respectively, with the edge labels indicating
the number of X.509 certiﬁcates and PGP keys containing the corresponding n-value as RSA
modulus. Note that all moduli in the K9 occur quite frequently.
Any two n-values associated to edges in the same depth one tree can be factored. Two n-values
associated to other edges can be factored if the edges are adjacent (i.e., share a vertex), or one
ﬁnds a path connecting them. For non-adjacent edges in the same connected component
from Figure 3.5 that is the unique central edge, for edges in the K9 many paths are possible. All
required edges are in our set of n-values.
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10110. . .783812683135232597
866
51 26 25 21 11
5321 X.509 certiﬁcates, 4627 RSA moduli
Figure 3.4 – The largest depth one tree found, on 4628 vertices, with the 512-bit prime p866
as root and leaves p2597, p13523, . . ., p10. The edges correspond to 4627 distinct 1024-bit
RSA moduli, with labels indicating the number of distinct X.509 certiﬁcates and PGP keys
containing the RSA modulus corresponding to the edge, for a total of 5321 certiﬁcates. All
certiﬁcates have expired and use SHA1 as hash function.
123861302275083876665914814408714816 1 6 11 7 1
1114112968366887419434672511559710 1 1 11 2 1
1173971202042141747912397101914770 1 1 11 1 1
Figure 3.5 – Six connected components consisting of four vertices, with labels as in Figure 3.4.
The eight primes in the top two components are 512 bits long, the other 16 are 256-bit primes).
The red edges correspond to RSA moduli contained in certiﬁcates that will not expire anytime
soon and that use SHA1 as hash function. The blue ones will expire soon and use MD5.
Affected RSA moduli and certiﬁcates. The 1995 components contain 14901 vertices and
12934 edges: 14901 distinct primes fully factoring 12934 distinct n-values (0.2% of the total),
11699 of which each occurs as RSA modulus in a single X.509 certiﬁcate or PGP key, and
1235 occurring more than once in, in total, 9720 certiﬁcates and keys. Thus, 11699+9720=
21419 X.509 certiﬁcates and PGP keys are affected. Note that affected moduli are much more
frequently shared than non-affected ones. None of the affected moduli are blacklisted.
Of the primes, 14592 are 512 bits long, 307 are 256-bit, and the remaining two have 257 bits.
Of the n-values, 214 are 512 bits long, and there are 12720 of 1024 bits. Of the 512-bit n-values
thus factored, 47 occur as RSA moduli in 188 X.509 certiﬁcates that have not expired and
use SHA1. Of the factored 1024-bit n-values, 3201 occur as RSA moduli in 5250 certiﬁcates
that have not expired and that use SHA1, of which 617 are regular non-self-signed end-user
certiﬁcates with “CA=false” (with 390 distinct RSA moduli). The majority (4633, with 2811
moduli) has “CA=true” and is self-signed, of which 727 (304 moduli) have been used to certify
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Figure 3.6 – Connected component consisting of nine vertices, corresponding to primes p376,
p1144, . . ., p14762 (all 512-bit). With labels as in Figure 3.4, in total 687 X.509 certiﬁcates are
involved. Six of those certiﬁcates have not expired yet, use SHA1 as hash function (as opposed
to MD5), and have “CA=false”; the red edges correspond to the RSA moduli contained in
those six certiﬁcates.
other RSA moduli (none among our collection of affected moduli). These 727 certiﬁcates
share their “issuer”-ﬁeld and the 304 RSA moduli occur in depth one trees not containing
moduli owned by others. So, this security issue is reasonably contained. But 4445 of the 5250
certiﬁcates (and 537 of the 617 end-user ones) have no relation to that issuer and have a
wide variety of “issuer” and “subject”-ﬁelds. This could be a security concern. We do not
and will not reveal what types of users or devices are affected. We note, however, that our data
give us more reason for concern than reported elsewhere (cf. [Hen12]) and that affected “ﬂesh
and blood” users that we talked to were not pleased3.
Discussion. Generation of a regular RSA modulus consists of ﬁnding two random prime
numbers. This must be done in such a way that these primes were not selected by anyone else
before. The probability not to regenerate a prime is commensurate with the security level if
NIST’s recommendation [U.S09, page 53] is followed to use a random seed of bit-length twice
the intended security level. Clearly, this recommendation is not always followed.
Irrespective of the way primes are selected (additive/sieving methods or methods using fresh
random bits for each attempted prime selection), a variety of obvious scenarios is conceivable
where poor initial seeding may lead to mishaps, with duplicate keys a consequence if no “fresh”
3“Donnerwetter!”
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local entropy is used at all. If the latter is used, the outcome may be worse: for instance, a
not-properly-random ﬁrst choice may be prime right away (the probability that this happens
is inversely proportional to the length of the prime, and thus non-negligible) and miss its
chance to proﬁt from local entropy to become unique. But local entropy may lead to a second
prime that is unique, and thus a vulnerable modulus.
The above may, to some extent, explain the occurrence of duplicate RSA moduli and depth
one trees. But we cannot explain the relative frequencies and appearance of these mishaps.
Neither do we understand how connected components in Figures 3.5 and 3.6 may be expected
to appear other than by very poor seeding or intentional malfeasance. Also, the great variation
of issuers and subjects of the affected X.509 certiﬁcates (including the K9) is disconcerting. No
correlation between certiﬁcation time and vulnerability of keys was detected. Vague, hand-
waving arguments suggest that some of the devices involved may have used about 32 bits of
entropy.
Avoiding two random choices during RSA modulus generation is straightforward (cf. [Len98]).
But the resulting moduli may have other, as yet unpublished weaknesses (we are not aware of
serious ones). It is better to make sure that cryptographic keys are generated only after proper
initialization of the source of randomness.
3.4 ElGamal, DSA, and ECDSA
In this section we present the results of various counts and tests that we conducted on the
data labeled as ElGamal, DSA, or ECDSA public keys. In neither collection did we ﬁnd any of
the numbers from [Moo08] (cf. Debian OpenSSL vulnerability [YRS+09]).
3.4.1 ElGamal
An ElGamal public key consists of a triple (p,g , y) where p is prime, g is a generator of the
multiplicative group (Z/pZ)∗ or a subgroup thereof of small index, and y is an element of 〈g 〉.
The secret key is an integer x ∈ {0,1, . . . ,p−2} with g x = y .
Correct ElGamal keys. Among the PGP keys, 2 546752 are labeled as ElGamal public keys.
Three are incomplete and were discarded. Of the remaining triples 82 contain a composite
p-value, resulting in 2546667 triples with correct p-values. Almost half (38) of the wrong
p-values share a pattern with 65.6% of the p-values in the correct ElGamal keys, cf. below.
Restricting to the triples (p,g , y) with prime p-values, a triple is a correct ElGamal public key
if y ∈ 〈g 〉. To verify this the order of g , and thus the factorization of p−1, is needed. This is
easy for safe primes (i.e., primes p for which (p−1)/2 is prime), but may be hard otherwise.
The order of g could be established for 70.8% of the triples (65.6% with safe primes, 5.2%
with primes p for which (p −1)/(2m) is prime and m > 1 has only small factors) and could
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Figure 3.7 – Cumulative numbers of p and q-sizes in ElGamal and DSA public keys, indicated
by “ElGamal 1”, “DSA p”, and “DSA q”; cumulative sizes of the distinct ElGamal p-values is
indicated by “ElGamal 2”.
reasonably be guessed for the other 29.2% (almost all with primes p for which (p −1)/2 is
composite but has no small factors). For at least 16.4% of the ElGamal keys the g -values do not
generate (Z/pZ)∗. This led to 33 failed membership tests y ∈ 〈g 〉, i.e., an insigniﬁcant 0.001%
of the triples. Note that if y ∈ 〈g 〉 a secret key exists; it does not follow that the owner knows it.
A handful of triples were identiﬁed with peculiar y-values for which it is doubtful if a secret
key is known to anyone.
Shared ElGamal keys. Six of the ElGamal keys occur twice: two keys with two unrelated
owners each, and four keys occurring twice but with the same owner.
ElGamal key sizes. Figure 3.7 depicts the cumulative p-sizes in the set of 2 546628 correct
ElGamal keys. There are 1437 different p-sizes, ranging from thrice 256 bits to nine times
16384 and once 20000. Most frequent are 2048 bits (69.3%), 1024 (11.2%), 4096 (10.8%) and
3072 (5.8%) followed by 1536 (1.3%), 1792 (0.7%), 768 (0.4%), and 1025 (0.04%).
Shared primes, generators. Primes and generators may be shared. Among the 2546628
distinct ElGamal keys 876 202 distinct p-values (and distinct (p,g )-pairs) occur. Despite this
high duplication rate, only 93 distinct p-values occur more than once. The four most frequent
p-values are “similar”. Let p(x,L) denote the least safe prime≥ x mod 2L . There is an integer v
such that p(v,L) for L-values 2048, 4096, 3072, 1536 occurs as p-value in 52.4%, 6.5%, 5.6%,
and 1% of the ElGamal keys, respectively (p(v,1024) occurs twice, p(v +2510,512) once, and as
noted above parts of v also occur in incorrect ElGamal keys). We suspect that these p-values,
of different sizes, were generated using similar software and identical random seeding (if any),
and from the least signiﬁcant bit up to the most signiﬁcant one.
All p(.,L)-values use g = 2, which for L = 2048 generates (Z/pZ)∗, but for the others an index
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two subgroup thereof. Overall, g = 2 occurs most frequently (70.8%), followed by g = 5 (19.5%),
6 (4.7%), 7 (1.9%), 11 (1.3%), and 13 (0.9%), with a total of 76 distinct g -values. No g -values
were found that do not have a large order, but for at least 9.6% of the distinct (p,g )-pairs the g -
values do not generate (Z/pZ)∗. We can only give a lower bound because, as pointed out above,
we failed to ﬁnd any prime factor of 29.2% of the (p−1)/2-values in the ElGamal keys (which
turns out to be 87.7% of the distinct (p−1)/2-values in the set of distinct p-values). Thus, we
cannot be certain that the corresponding generators were properly chosen; consistent failure
of all ECM factoring attempts of these numbers suggests, however, that they were well chosen.
Among the distinct ElGamal keys, all y-values are distinct, which is as expected because
distinct (p,g )-pairs have negligible probability to lead to the same y-value (and identical
(p,g )-pairs with identical y-values have already been identiﬁed and removed). The secret
keys, however, may still be the same. But as there is no way to tell if that is the case (for distinct
(p,g )-pairs) there is no serious security risk even if they are.
3.4.2 DSA
A DSA public key is a four-tuple (p,q,g , y) where p and q are primes with q dividing p −1,
the element g generates an order q subgroup of the multiplicative group (Z/pZ)∗, and y is an
element of 〈g 〉. The secret key is the integer x ∈ {0,1, . . . ,q−1} with g x = y .
Correct DSA keys. Among the PGP keys and X.509 certiﬁcates, 2 536 959 and 141 four-tuples,
respectively, are labeled as DSA keys. All four-tuples were ﬁrst checked for correctness, casting
them aside at the ﬁrst test they failed. The tests were conducted in the following order: T1:
primality of p; T2: primality of q ; T3: divisibility of p −1 by q ; T4: order of g equals q ; and
T5: order of y equals q . An insigniﬁcant 0.002% (66) of the PGP four-tuples are incorrect
with failures 12×T1, 2×T2, 10×T4, and 42×T5 (where T2 failed twice for the same q-value, as
it occurred twice). The X.509 DSA four-tuples passed all tests. Some of the failures may be
due to transcription errors, as they occur in four-tuples that differ from correct ones in a few
hexadecimal positions.
Shared DSA keys. The remaining 2536893 PGP DSA keys contain very few duplicates: one
key occurs thrice (with possibly double ownership) and two keys occur twice each (each with
single ownership), resulting in a total of 2 536889 distinct PGP DSA keys. Although all 141
X.509 DSA keys are distinct, 95 of them are also among the PGP DSA keys, resulting in a total
of 2536889+141−95 = 2536935 DSA keys. We have not checked ownerships of these 95
duplicate DSA keys.
DSA key sizes. The cumulative p and q-sizes in the set of 2 536935 DSA keys are depicted
in Figure 3.7. There are nine different q-sizes: all except 0.2% (5012) are 160, with 256, 224,
and 232 the most frequent exceptions occurring 4016, 702, and 249 times, respectively. The
smallest and largest q-sizes are 160 and 512, the latter with seven occurrences. With 78
71
Chapter 3. Public Keys
different sizes the variation among p-sizes is larger, though nowhere close to the variation
among ElGamal p-sizes. All except 0.6% (15457) of the p-sizes are 1024, with 768, 2048, 3072
and 512 the most frequent exceptions with 9733, 3529, 1468 and 519 occurrences, respectively.
The smallest and largest p-sizes are 512 and 16384, the latter with a single occurrence.
Shared primes, generators. Distinct DSA keys may contain identical p, q , or g values. In total
2 535 074 distinct p-values occur, with 2 535 037 distinct primes occurring once, 22 occurring
twice, ﬁve occurring thrice, etc., up to a prime occurring 969 times (note the difference with
ElGamal). Not surprisingly (but not necessarily, as the same q-value may give rise to many
different p-values), the overall counts and numbers of occurrences are the same for the
distinct q-values and the distinct (p,q)-pairs. Although the generator also allows considerable
variation, the number of distinct (p,q,g )-triples is the same too. For all except 265 of the
unique (p,q,g )-triples, the generator g equals 2(p−1)/q . We have not been able to determine
how the other 265 generators were chosen.
The y-values are all distinct among the distinct DSA keys – given that shared keys were already
removed, identical y-values would have been odd indeed. The same remark as above applies
concerning identical secret keys.
3.4.3 ECDSA
The only interesting fact we can report about ECDSA is the surprisingly small number of
certiﬁcates encountered that contain an ECDSA key (namely, just one), and the small number
of certiﬁcates signed by ECDSA (one self-signed and a handful of RSA keys). As long as one
subscribes to the notion of a standardized curve over a ﬁnite ﬁeld of prime cardinality of a
special form, as opposed to a randomly but properly chosen curve over a non-special prime
ﬁeld (cf. [LM10]), there is nothing wrong with the curve parameters secp384r1. It offers (in
“theory”) about 192 bits of security which makes it, security-wise, comparable to 8000-bit RSA
moduli (n) and ElGamal or DSA ﬁnite ﬁeld sizes (p), and 384-bit DSA subgroup sizes (q).
3.4.4 ElGamal and (EC)DSA.
Not surprisingly, the intersection of the sets of p-values for ElGamal and for DSA is empty. We
have not tried hard to retrieve any of the secret exponents, i.e., (for ElGamal and DSA) x-values
such that g x = y , but have checked that none is less than 212 in absolute value.
Random nonces in ElGamal and (EC)DSA. Unlike RSA, during signature generation ElGamal
and (EC)DSA require a random nonce that should be entirely unpredictable (cf. [ElG85, NS02,
NS03]). We are not aware of any studies that verify whether or not the nonces are properly
chosen (with the notable exception of [Dar11]). Collecting data for such a study requires a
much more intrusive type of data collection and may be considered unethical. Note, however,
that a mishap in the form of a poorly chosen nonce affects only the party that makes the poor
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choice, but does not affect any other party. In particular the choice of two identical nonces for
distinct ElGamal or DSA parameters does not affect anyone but the two users involved.
Discussion. Both for ElGamal and DSA a small number of keys were identiﬁed that are shared
among unrelated parties. This may be a security concern. Furthermore, there were some
ill-formatted keys that cannot be expected to work and that should be of insigniﬁcant security
concern. From the point of view of this work, the main security concern for ElGamal and
(EC)DSA is the generation of the random nonce; this is a key usage but not a key generation
issue and therefore beyond the scope of this work.
3.5 Conclusion
We checked the computational properties of millions of public keys that we collected on the
web. The majority does not seem to suffer from obvious weaknesses and can be expected to
provide the expected level of security. We found that on the order of 0.003% of public keys is
incorrect, which does not seem to be unacceptable. We were surprised, however, by the extent
to which public keys are shared among unrelated parties. For ElGamal and DSA sharing is
rare, but for RSA the frequency of sharing may be a cause for concern. What surprised us most
is that many thousands of 1024-bit RSA moduli, including thousands that are contained in
still-valid X.509 certiﬁcates, offer no security at all. This may indicate that proper seeding of
random number generators is still a problematic issue.
The lack of sophistication of our methods and ﬁndings make it hard for us to believe that
what we have presented is new, in particular to agencies and parties that are known for their
curiosity in such matters. It may shed new light on NIST’s 1991 decision to adopt DSA as digital
signature standard as opposed to RSA, back then a “public controversy” (cf. [DLL+93]); but
note the well-known nonce-randomness concerns for ElGamal and (EC)DSA (cf. Section 3.4.4)
and what happens if the nonce is not properly used (cf. [Dar11]).
Factoring one 1024-bit RSA modulus would be historic. Factoring 12720 such moduli is a
statistic. The former is still out of reach for the academic community (but anticipated). The
latter comes as an unwelcome warning that underscores the difﬁculty of key generation in the
real world.
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4 Privacy Leaks through File Sizes
4.1 Motivation
Encryption of stored data is an unavoidable security requirement when one wishes to out-
source storage infrastructure to a third party. Low overhead from the cryptographic layer is
obviously a desirable property.
Stream ciphers produce ciphertexts the same size as their corresponding cleartexts, down to
the single bit if needed. This can also be achieved with block ciphers by using the appropriate
modes:
• Counter (CTR) mode produces a cryptographically secure pseudorandom stream by
concatenating the ciphertexts produced by encrypting an increasing counter initialized
at a secure IV.
• Output Feedback (OFB) mode likewise produces a stream by iterating the encryption
function over a secure IV, and concatenating the ciphertexts of each iterated step.
• Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode produces a stream by encrypting the stream ciphertext
itself, usually with a ﬁxed offset of one block. It is thus not identiﬁable to a stream cipher,
but still maintains the property that the ciphertext can be cut down to the exact size of
the plaintext without losing information.
If we suppose that the keys and initialization vectors are stored elsewhere, as part of the
metadata, such setups have no storage overhead. While it may seem desirable in terms of
space efﬁciency, it also allows a passive attacker to observe the exact size of the cleartext. It
is also still the case if the system has a ﬁxed or predictable overhead, such as when it is just
storing a single initialization vector per object.
While this information leak may be less of a concern in a context where message size conveys
little information, one can wonder if this is still the case for immutable systems archiving large
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ﬁles. In this chapter, we will try to assess the potential security consequences of this property
on realistic systems.
For the following discussion, we will follow the IEC standard [IEC08]: Classical SI preﬁxes used
with bytes (kB, MB, GB. . . ) refer to their habitual powers of 1000, while binary preﬁxes (kiB,
MiB, GiB. . . ) refer to powers of 1024.
We can compute a coarse estimate of the probability of a ﬁle to have a unique size. Let us take
movies as an example. At the time of this writing, IMDB statistics [IMD] advertise knowledge
of 340k movies. As the worst case, consider that all of them are available in storage, with
inefﬁcient duplication of content for all the possible audio languages, subtitle languages, and
codec choices; a conservative estimation is 104 for an upper bound on the average number of
variants per movie (100 audio languages, 10 subtitle language choices for each audio variant,
and 10 different codecs). Let us further assume that ﬁle sizes are uniformly distributed in a
range of the order of 2×109 bytes (between 1 and 3 GiB).
Assume we have k distinct ﬁles being randomly mapped over a range of n possible distinct ﬁle
sizes. We are interested to compute the probability P that some observed ﬁle size is unique.
Let P0 be the probability that a ﬁle size is mapped by no ﬁles, P1 be the probability that a size
is mapped by exactly one ﬁle, and P2+ the probability that a size is mapped by two ﬁles or
more. Deriving P0 and P1 from a binomial law, we have:
P0 =
(
n−1
n
)k
P1 = k
n
(
n−1
n
)k−1
P2+ = 1−P0−P1
P = P1
P1+P2+
= P1
1−P0
For the chosen n = 2×109 and k = 340×107, we compute a probability P ≈ 0.38 of being
mapped to a unique ﬁle. While this is a very coarse estimation, it shows that we cannot
simply dismiss the possibility that the exact size of a large multimedia ﬁle conveys signiﬁcant
information about its contents.
In systems like Tahoe [WOW08], the problem is exacerbated by the use of convergent encryp-
tion, a mechanism which allows deduplication of encrypted data. A convergent encryption
scheme ensures that the same contents, encrypted by two different users, will produce the
same ciphertext (hence the ciphertexts are said to converge). One can build a convergent en-
cryption scheme by requiring that keys and initialization vectors are deterministically derived
from the actual ﬁle contents, for instance by a cryptographically secure hash function.
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Convergent encryption has the drawback that anyone can probe the storage system and tell
if some content already exists. In extreme cases such as very small ﬁles with mostly known
content, it might even be possible to guess the full contents through brute force, as seen
in [HPSP10].
To avert these attacks, the convergent key derivation process might be salted by a convergence
secret. Only users sharing the same convergence secret will beneﬁt from mutual deduplication
of their storage space, at the cost of potentially exposing themselves to these side-channel
leaks. A user who does not care for such attacks may use a publicly agreed-on value, to beneﬁt
from maximal deduplication, while a paranoid user may use a random secret value, and get
no deduplication at all.
In order for the convergent scheme to work, all participating users must obviously agree on
ciphers, and key derivation algorithms. In the case of Tahoe, for instance, using AES in CTR
mode is part of the agreement.
4.2 Typical Block Sizes
For practical reasons, when operating close to the hardware layer, storage systems will typically
operate on blocks for efﬁciency reasons. The optimal block size poses a trade-off between
wasted space, and compactness and efﬁciency in the metadata management. In fact, the
ubiquitous use of the byte as the smallest storage unit is already a choice of block size, albeit
a tiny one. The native size for block storage on Unix is 512 bytes. Ext4, the current default
ﬁlesystem for Linux, uses blocks between 1 and 64kB, the default being 4kB. AES operates on
blocks of 16 bytes. BitTorrent uses two levels of granularity: pieces, offering granularity for
the integrity checks (of variable size, typically of a power of 2, between 218 and 224 bytes), and
blocks, offering granularity for the network transfers, for which the de facto universal standard
is 16kB [Coh08].
4.3 Data Collection
We chose to study the set of ﬁles publicly shared over BitTorrent. In addition to being a
well alive and popular technology [PGES05], ﬁle names and sizes can be extracted from the
metainfo blocks of .torrent ﬁles. Data is cryptographically authenticated, and .torrent
ﬁles can in turn be obtained from community-vetted sources. The ﬁle names extracted from
these are presumably more reliable than with other P2P ﬁlesharing technologies, where the
cost of registering and disseminating a bogus entry can be very low.
What we discovered empirically deviates from models used to represent ﬁle size distribution
in typical computer systems [Mit04]. Nevertheless, while not representative of the ﬁles a single
user might store on a home computer, content sampled from P2P networks is arguably more
representative of typical content which would be most likely to be found in cloud-based public
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storage, and beneﬁt the most from deduplication.
We scraped public repositories such as The Pirate Bay [SNS], as well as various other, private,
sources. We acquired around 7M .torrent ﬁles, containing metadata for a total of 12.4M
downloadable ﬁles. The downloadable data represents a total volume of 437.8TB (398.2 TiB).
4.3.1 Architecture of BitTorrent
The unit of sharing in BitTorrent is not the ﬁle, but the torrent. A torrent is an immutable set of
related ﬁles (possibly a singleton set), cryptographically authenticated. The metadata for the
torrent are contained in a small .torrent ﬁle. These ﬁles initially needed to be distributed
through an external channel.
Most datastructures in BitTorrent uses Bencoding [Coh08], a serialization format supporting
the usual dynamic datastructure paradigm (integers, strings, lists, and associative lists). A
.torrent ﬁle is itself a Bencoding representation of a metainfo datastructure. The largest part
of the metainfo structure is usually the info datastructure, which contains the unchanging
information pertaining to the downloadable ﬁle set, such as the ﬁle names, ﬁle sizes, and
the chosen piece size. In short, the info structure contains information about what to down-
load, and the rest of the metainfo structure contains information about how to download it.
Thus, information outside the info structure may change at any time without breaking the
authentication of the data.
To perform the cryptographical integrity check, the client considers the concatenation of all
the ﬁles in the torrent, arranged by lexicographic order of their respective ﬁle names, and
slices this stream in pieces of regular size1. The SHA-1 of every piece is computed and stored
in the info structure. BitTorrent clients may negotiate transfer of multiple pieces in parallel,
and use the hashes to verify the integrity of the downloaded data while the download is in
progress. They may safely start uploading veriﬁed pieces, and can legitimately punish2 peers
who transmit incorrect data, without losing efﬁciency.
Because Bencoding imposes a canonical ordering when serializing associative arrays, the info
structure has a deterministic, consistent serialization, that can then itself be authenticated by
its SHA-13 hash, which is called the infohash value.
1The block size is uniform across a single torrent, but can otherwise be freely chosen by the torrent publisher. It
offers a trade-off between the metadata size and the integrity check granularity. The last piece may be smaller than
the chosen piece size.
2Typically by uploading to faulty peers at a reduced rate, or refusing to upload anything at all.
3There are no plans to upgrade to a more secure hash function. However in this case, collisions are not much of
a problem; second preimage attacks would be.
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4.3.2 Trackerless operation
The original operation mode of BitTorrent relies on a tracker service, a compromise between a
fully centralized index service (like the original Napster design, which proved very fragile under
pressure of censorship) and completely distributed search mechanisms like Gnutella (based
on broadcasting, slow and wasteful) or Kademlia [MM02] (a Distributed Hash Table based on
the XOR metric, reasonably efﬁcient, but less suitable for operation on private networks, and
without accounting support). The tracker service acts as an index of all the peers interested
in downloading or sharing the data; peers announce themselves periodically4, and receive
a list of other active peers. Peers can contact each other at any time and negotiate a data
transfer. However, instead of having a single global tracker service, each torrent can run on
a separate tracker (the address of the tracker(s) is part of the .torrent data. This allows
BitTorrent to operate as a data distribution protocol on private networks, and not only for
public ﬁlesharing.)
In this original design, the tracker service is a target of choice for censorship. If a tracker is
only responsible for a small set of torrents, disabling it will cripple distribution of this torrent
set, and nothing else.
As a consequence of the cat-and-mouse game between ﬁlesharers and censorship attempts,
various improvements have been developed to make the protocol more robust against censor-
ship. The three more important mechanisms are:
• A Distributed Hash Table complements or replaces the original tracker mechanism. The
DHT service stores arbitrary key-value pairs in a fully distributed fashion, and cannot
be easily shut down. Peers register themselves by adding their own addresses under the
key for the infohash they are interested in, and query the same key to ﬁnd out about
other peers.
• The Peer Exchange Extension allows peers to exchange contacts directly, making the
role of the tracker less critical. In addition, cautious peers may choose not to announce
themselves to a tracker, and only query the DHT without registering in it, to become less
visible to outsiders (they will only reveal themselves, through peer exchange, to peers
actively engaging in the download, or at least faking it up to a certain point; they cannot
be spotted just by hitting the tracker or querying the DHT)
• The Metadata Extension allows peers to request and exchange the full content of the
metadata structure for the torrent.
It should be noted that these extensions were developed in response to rather arbitrary ju-
risprudence. Initially, large sites like The Pirate Bay [SNS], hosting torrents containing legally
4Typically every 5 minutes.
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dubious contents, did hide behind the fact that they were only hosting metadata, and not ac-
tual contents. When this position became unreasonably hard to maintain, they removed the ac-
tual .torrent ﬁles, instead offering only an index of interesting infohash values, in the form of
Magnet Uniform Resource Identiﬁers. Magnet URIs are but one form of URIs [Cha01, CSF+08]
that contain nothing but a cryptographic hash of the target data (in our case, the infohash). For
some reason, metadata are considered less problematic when passed through a cryptographic
hash function, and reduced from a few kilobytes to a hundred of bytes, even when the cryp-
tographic hash function can be easily inverted thanks to the availability of the peer-to-peer
network.
When the three extensions above are implemented, the infohash is the only piece of infor-
mation required to acquire the torrent contents in an authenticated way. The process is as
follows:
• If necessary, bootstrap the connection to the DHT, through the use of well-known
nodes.5
• Query the DHT with the known infohash as the key, obtain a list of peer addresses.
• Contact some peers, announce the infohash value, and identify peers supporting the
Metadata Extension.
• Make a metadata request, obtain the full info structure.
• Use the Peer Exchange Extension to obtain more peer addresses from the existing ones.
• Proceed normally.
4.3.3 Fast Resolution of Magnet URIs
Because we did not want to exclude sites offering only magnet links for our study, we had to
acquire a way of retrieving the .torrent ﬁles associated to a particular magnet link. At the
time of this investigation, no easy publicly available, scriptable tool existed to perform this
task, short of running a full BitTorrent client and actually running the download.
The probable reason is that performing this operation already requires implementing the
most complex components of a full BitTorrent client: a DHT client, a Bencoding serializer and
deserializer (because messages for the metadata request use it), and network code to contact
the peers. Once a tool reaches this stage of development, there is little work remaining to turn
it into a complete BitTorrent client.
We used code from Etorrent [And], a BitTorrent client written in Erlang, and adapted it to
perform the minimal steps required to resolve a magnet link. In particular, the program joins
5This only needs to be done once per client, and only on the ﬁrst run or after a long period of inactivity.
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the DHT, and is able to query it, but never registers itself under any infohash value. It does
connect to peers, and makes a metadata transfer request, then disconnects immediately. All
operations are cheap to do asynchronously thanks to Erlang, allowing us to resolve our large
collection of magnet links much faster than a naive implementation.
Unfortunately, because we have to disclose the infohash value we are interested in, we cannot
ensure that the peer will not associate our address with the infohash and propagate it further,
at least temporarily, through the Peer Exchange extension. Testing this may become the
subject of future work.
While performing this process, we observed that a very signiﬁcant fraction (more than 25%)
of the peers registered in the DHT refused to answer our connection requests. This could be
related to network ﬁltering issues6, but another possible explanation is the parasitic use of
the DHT to run ampliﬁed Distributed Denial-of-Service attacks. This kind of behaviour has
already been investigated in [EDGM07].
4.3.4 Performance
We found operating on a collection of millions of very small ﬁles to be quite taxing for the
default Linux ﬁlesystem we used (ext3). When random access to a speciﬁc torrent is not
required, it is at least an order of magnitude faster to store the collection packed in a single
tar ﬁle, and to unpack it on-the-ﬂy and stream the torrent ﬁles to the analysis process. The
sample code we used to do so is available on Github7.
4.4 Analysis and Results
Because fetching actual data would be unreasonably costly in terms of bandwidth and storage,
we restrict ourselves to analysing the metadata only. Unfortunately, the hashes stored in the
metainfo correspond to blocks not necessarily aligned with ﬁle boundaries.8. Therefore it is
not in general possible to tell if two ﬁles of identical size are likely to be identical in content,
unless the two torrents happen to use the same block size, and the respective offsets in the
two torrent streams differ by exactly a multiple of this block size.
We thus restrict ourselves to using ﬁle names as identiﬁers for the content. A ﬁle name is
not always a reliable predictor for content: typically, in the case of uncompressed ebooks,
it is common for ﬁles to be named after the number of the page, without additional hints
identifying the ebook itself. It is also relatively common for some archive formats to split a
large archive across several ﬁxed-size ﬁles, and give these ﬁles a name derived from a common
regular pattern. Nevertheless, the relationship between ﬁle sizes and names can still be
6Operation behind Network Address Translation (NAT) gateways is widely known to be problematic.
7https://github.com/maugier/tortar
8Some clients address this problem by adding special zero-ﬁlled padding ﬁles, exactly of the size required to
make the beginning of the next real ﬁle align with a block boundary, but this practice is not generalized.
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Size (GiB) Name
222.9 LIBRARY .zip
166.4 DJANDYW.TK ULTIMATE SAMPLES COLLETION.zip
120.9 Harry Potter.mpeg
116.6 Hetero.rar
86.6 AGI.rar
82.9 Ponibooru-All-Safe.zip
68.0 Robert.Gustafsson.Ultimate.Collection.SWEDiSH.BOX.PAL.DVDr.rar
63.7 Desktop.rar
56.4 Music, Pictures, and Meth.zip
55.6 Крепкий орешек.mkv
Table 4.1 – Largest ﬁles observed
objectively measured and used to predict ﬁle names.
We observed 6.35M distinct ﬁlename-ﬁlesize pairs (6.33M after removal of special empty
padding ﬁles.) About 4k ﬁles had a size of zero. Of these empty ﬁles, 1.2k seemed to follow
a systematic naming convention containing movie or TV show metadata (name, year and
episode). It is thus an ad-hoc method for storing relevant metadata in the downloaded data
itself, in a reliable cross-platform way.
The rest of the empty ﬁles have benign names. They are most likely the result of human
error, the respective torrents having been created while the download from the original (non
BitTorrent) source was not yet complete.
As an indication, the 10 largest ﬁles observed in the collection are in Table 4.19. Interpretation
of the ﬁle names is left to the reader.
4.4.1 File types
Table 4.2 shows the 20 most frequent ﬁle extensions, as announced by the metadata. In
principle, we cannot check the accuracy of the extensions against the actual content, as we do
not have access to it. However, as said before, the torrents and magnet links were obtained
from sources which perform a community vetting process on them, so we expect the majority
of them to at least not be deliberate fraud attempts.
The predominance of image ﬁles was somewhat surprising to us, but can be partially explained
by the way ebooks are sometimes packaged (as uncompressed directories of one image per
page, typically.)
Table 4.3 shows the 20 ﬁle extensions representing the largest data volume in the collection.
Without surprise, video ﬁles are by far the largest space consumer.
9Errors in the ﬁle names are authentic.
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Extension Filenames Extension Filenames
.jpg 2701999 .wav 53350
.mp3 1239286 .txt 51929
.avi 229170 .cbr 43171
.ﬂac 146078 .zip 40609
.png 134382 .srt 37573
.mp4 121384 .vob 34489
.mkv 106705 .wmv 30351
.pdf 105190 .exe 29437
.rar 92016 .ﬂv 26996
.nfo 55560 .m4a 25976
Table 4.2 – Distinct ﬁle names for most frequent extensions
Extension Volume (TB) Extension Volume (TB)
.mkv 117.752 .zip 4.762
.avi 109.163 .bin 4.599
.mp4 44.829 .mpg 3.098
.iso 41.902 .m4v 2.899
.rar 16.977 .ts 2.723
.m2ts 13.360 .exe 2.554
.mp3 11.387 .ﬂv 1.906
.wmv 10.899 .jpg 1.630
.vob 8.743 .mov 1.395
.ﬂac 5.492 .pdf 1.351
Table 4.3 – Data volume by advertised extension
To get a ﬁner analysis, we group these extensions by media type, according to Table 4.4, and
look at them as distinct collections.
Figure 4.1 shows the overall histogram of the number of different ﬁle names observed for
some given size. Points at the bottom (y = 1) denote unique ﬁle sizes for which it is possible
to unambiguously guess the ﬁlename (assuming prior knowledge that the ﬁle is part of this
torrent collection). One can see that the ﬁrst unique ﬁle sizes appear around 8kiB (below this
bound, no accurate guesses can be made) and the last non-unique ﬁle sizes cluster around
17GiB (above this bound, ﬁle sizes are always unique).
Interestingly, if one presupposes knowledge of the media type (audio, video, . . . ), the respective
histograms offer very different shapes, as seen in Figure 4.2:
• For audio, one expects the sizes to cluster around the approximate sizes, for typical
encoding parameters, of a song of typical size.
• For images, the same clustering can be observed around typical wallpaper resolutions
and their sub-multiples.
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Media type Extension Notes
archive .zip Common under Windows
.rar For historical reasons, popular among the ﬁlesharing crowd
.r[0-9][0-9] RAR uses numbered extensions (.r00, .r01, . . . ) for split archives
audio .ﬂac Free Lossless Audio Codec, popular among audiophiles
.mp3 Historical de facto standard of ﬁlesharers
.m4a Container for Advanced Audio Coding (AAC)
.ogg Open multimedia container, but audio most of the time
.wav Historical PCM container
.wma Windows Media Audio
image .bmp Windows bitmap format
.gif Graphics Interchange Format
.jpg JPEG
.png Portable Network Graphics
video .avi Audio Video Interleave, historical Microsoft multimedia container
.ﬂv Flash Video (Macromedia/Adobe)
.mkv Matroska, an open multimedia container
.mp4 MPEG-4
.m2ts Native container format for BluRay discs
.ts MPEG Transport Stream, possibly from digital TV or satellite broadcasts
.vob Video Object, native format for DVD discs
.wmv Windows Media Video
iso .iso ISO 9660 format, “mirror images” of optical media (CD, DVD, BluRay. . . )
Table 4.4 – Media type by extension
Figure 4.1 – Distinct ﬁle names for each possible ﬁle size, all types together
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• For videos, we observe much tighter clusters around 367MiB, 576Mib, and 1.07GiB. We
are not certain of the origin of the ﬁrst. The second corresponds to the space available to
the user on a 700MiB CD-R after it has been formatted with Microsoft’s Live File System,
their native packet writing format for Windows. The third corresponds to a limitation in
the UDF disk format, which uses a 30-bit integer to store ﬁle sizes.
• For ISOs the strongest cluster occurs around 4.7GB, as expected for single-layer DVD
images, the second strongest around 8.7GB (double-layer single-sided DVDs).
• Finally, compared to other categories, Archives have the largest amount of identical
sizes. This is due in great part to split archives, historical formats consisting of several
identically-sized blocks. While the original use for such splits was to easily split large
datasets across removable media, it is still popular in some ﬁlesharing circles, as a
low-tech alternative that allows parallel downloading across multiple endpoints (and
races between uploaders) on top of old protocols, like FTP, that were not designed to
support multihomed transfers at the ﬁle level.
Figure 4.3 shows, for each media type, the rank of every observed distinct pair of ﬁle name
and size, when sorted by descending ﬁle size. Vertical drops are large sets of ﬁles sharing the
same size. The ﬂat segments at the start of each curve are rare, abnormally small ﬁles, that
may indicate incomplete transfers.
Figure 4.4 shows the cumulative probability distribution of uncertainty over the ﬁle name,
given a ﬁxed ﬁle size randomly chosen uniformly among all the possible observable ﬁle sizes.
The curve gives, for a given entropy value (the logarithm base 2 of the number of possible ﬁle
names), the amount of different ﬁle sizes having less than the speciﬁed uncertainty.
4.4.2 Entropy losses
To quantify the privacy loss caused by the disclosure of a ﬁle size, a good metric would be
the average difference of entropy in the distributions of ﬁle names with and without some
knowledge of the size. This knowledge may be of the exact byte-wise ﬁle size, or it may be
block-wise for various typical block sizes.
For the rest of this section, we consider a random uniform choice over all possible distinct ﬁle
entries. Entries are distinct if they differ by size, or by ﬁlename (without the base path), or
both.
Disregarding the ﬁle size information, the effective entropy of the ﬁle name distribution is
21.918 bits. It would have reached 22.594 bits if all 6.33M entries had distinct ﬁle names,
but there is an ample supply of ﬁles with different sizes and identical names. The worst
offenders are movie cover images (cover.jpg, front.jpg, back.jpg), VOB ﬁles ripped with
their original internal-use-only names, executable installers (setup.exe), and ﬁles named
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(a) Audio (b) Images
(c) Video (d) ISOs
(e) Archives (f) Other
Figure 4.2 – Distinct ﬁle names for each possible ﬁle size, arranged by media type
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Figure 4.3 – Ranking by size of distinct ﬁles
Figure 4.4 – Ranks of ﬁle name entropy, ﬁle size known up to the byte
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Figure 4.5 – Distinguishable ﬁle sizes, for given uncertainty over ﬁle name, with different block
rounding
after just a single number (unpacked ebooks with one ﬁle per page, named 001.jpg, 002.jpg,
. . . , and music CDs with Track 1.mp3, Track 2.mp3, . . . .)
Figure 4.5 shows the distribution of entropy over the ﬁle name, given a randomly picked ﬁle
size, when the sizes have been rounded up to some typical block size values. As expected,
the curves are mostly decreasing, reﬂecting the increasingly lower probability to collide with
another ﬁle size by chance. We do not know how to explain the irregularities in the curves, in
particular the spike exhibited by 16-bytes blocks.
We then compute information leaked, on average, by observing the ﬁle size rounded up to a
chosen block size. To do so, we take our collection of known ﬁle sizes, perform the rounding,
then compute the entropy of the resulting distribution. Figure 4.6 shows the information
leaked, on average, when block sizes are powers of 4, starting from 16 to 416.
We can see the privacy increases almost linearly with the block size, for a domain of realistic
values ranging up to 1MB. After that, the beneﬁts decrease, and the curve is of course expected
to hit exactly zero when the block size becomes larger than the largest ﬁle in the collection.
Figure 4.7 shows the trade-off between information leaked, and total wasted space. The total
wasted space is the sum, for every known ﬁle, of the difference between their actual size and
their rounded-up size.
The remarkable similarity between the two ﬁgures is explained by the fact that wasted space
increases almost linearly with block size.
Figure 4.7 also shows the trade-off for an adaptive padding scheme where ﬁle sizes are rounded
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Figure 4.6 – Information in truncated ﬁle sizes, per block size
up the nearest larger power of respectively

2, 2, 4, and 8. Larger bases are more wasteful,
and leak less information. Much to our disappointment, this scheme seems to offer a worse
trade-off than a simple ﬁxed block size. This may be explained by the fact that adaptive
padding, as we tested it, is very wasteful for the largest ﬁles, but leaks less information about
these large ﬁles, which are on average less common than the small ones.
4.5 Conclusion
Information leakage through ﬁle sizes, be they exact byte-wise size or up to rounding to a small
block size, appears to be a legitimate concern in the case of media ﬁles, according to what we
could measure from publicly available information. The obvious solution to this problem is to
use an appropriate padding mechanism to make relatively close ﬁle sizes indistinguishable,
enough for the uncertainty to go back to acceptable levels.
Padding will be wasteful, unless the padding scheme chosen makes the storage system aware
of the padding. We can distinguish between two scenarios: padding the data transfers only,
which will protect against a passive attacker listening on the communication channel, and will
cost bandwidth, but not storage space; and padding the data, on top of the encryption layer (of
which the storage system must not be aware), which protects against an honest-but-curious
storage system, but costs storage space.
There will be a trade-off between wasted resources and privacy loss. In order to ﬁnd the
optimal one, one must ﬁrst assign a cost to privacy loss, in order to compare it to storage
costs. However, no matter which trade-off is chosen, if one assumes that privacy should be
equivalent for most ﬁles, no matter their sizes, the size distribution shows that the padded
89
Chapter 4. Privacy Leaks through File Sizes
Figure 4.7 – Information in truncated ﬁle sizes, per wasted space
block size should be roughly proportional to the ﬁle size. Unfortunately, a naive padding
scheme, for instance to the next power of two, or to the next fractional power of two (in effect,
the next power of some integer root of two) seems to be strictly worse than a ﬁxed block size.
Variable-length blocks delimited by rolling hashes, as described in Section 1.1.3, may offer
best results. Unfortunately, testing this hypothesis would require access to the actual data, not
just the metadata we currently have.
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